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DELEGATION TO PRIVATE PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In an age in which so much of constitutional litigation involves
efforts to apply or expand the "state action" doctrine under the four-
teenth amendment, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid
to a major constitutional weapon of the 1930's: the doctrine of non-
delegation to private parties.' Since the end of the Depression, com-
prehensive federal schemes of agricultural or industrial regulation
liave been undertaken less frequently, and the doctrine has usually
'found new application only in the states, primarily in zoning cases,
cases involving the validity of privately established professional and
industrial standards, and decisions relating to local option elections,
the creation of special taxing districts, and state resale price mainten-
ance laws.
At the time that Professors Jaffe and Hale wrote their surveys
of the subject almost 40 years ago,2 the basis for the doctrine seemed
much clearer than it does today. Courts could wax vehement (though
they did not always do so) when legislative enactments gave individuals
the right to control the conduct and action of others. Belief in laissez
faire and the sanctity of property rights could lead courts to overlook
the ways in which the defense of private rights could produce results
not greatly different from those which obtain as a result of delegation
to private persons.
The history is a familiar one. At common law, private coercive
power was not sanctioned. Thus the Supreme Court in 1917 readily
granted an injunction against mild organizational efforts by a labor
union on the basis that the union induced breach of -,.n oral yellow dog
contract, and thereby infringed the penumbra of protection cast around
I"[T]he majority rule is that the power to legislate may not be delegated by the
legislature to the people." 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
306 (3d ed. F. Horac, Jr. 1943).
"Legislation may be held invalid if it empowers private persons to decide either what
the law shall be or when a law shall be effective." 1 C.D. SANDS, [SUTHERLAND] STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4.11 (4th ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).
The present article, in concerning itself with delegation to private parties, is confined
to an analysis of the cases passing upon legislative delegations. No effort is made here
to consider the constitutional consequences of transfer of functions to private individuals
by branches of the government other than the legislature, nor the doctrines which operate
[(or once operated) to restrict legislative delegations to administrative agencies. A recent
work on numerous aspects of the doctrine is S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
I)ELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL Powmt (1975).
2 Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. Rv. 201 (1937) ; Hale, Our
Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties, 39 COLUm. L. REv. 563 (1939). See also S. BARBER,
THE CONSTrUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CoNGassIONMA. Powa 72-107 (1975).
INDIANA LAW IOURNAL [Vol. 50:650
private contract rights.' And where legislative delegations rather than
common law principles were involved, the Court five years earlier, in
Eubank v. City of Richmond,' likewise struck down a zoning law which,
by allowing two-thirds of the residents of a street to request establish-
ment of building lines, compelled an owner to remove "an octagon
bay window . . . which projected about three feet over the line."
"[T] here is control of the property of plaintiff in error by other owners
of property exercised under the ordinance. This, as we have said, is
the vice of the ordinance."5
Given this constitutional background, and the volatile Schechter6
and Carter Coal7 decisions of the 1930's, one might be surprised to dis-
cover that more than 30 years has passed since any major Supreme
Court decision turned on the question of delegation to private parties.'
At first glance, it is tempting to conclude that the doctrine is slumbering
in largely deserved desuetude.9 Yet there are also indications that the
1Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917), discussed in Jaffe,
supra note 2, at 215-16.
4226 U.S. 137 (1912).
5 Id. at 144.
6 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) ("Here
.is an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group
of acts identified or described by reference to a standard" (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
7Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) ("This is legislative delegation
in its most obnoxious form; for it is ...to private persons whose interests may be.
adverse to the interests of others in the same business.")
8 But see note 82 infra. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), appears to be the
most recent case to extensively discuss the issue. On the Parker "state action" exception
to the antitrust laws, see Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections
on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUm. L. REv. 328 (1975). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975) ; New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
9 See, e.g., Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L.
Ray. 561, 581 (1947) ("Were the country to enter a new depression or become committed
to general planning, insistence on the doctrine of the Schechter case might again provoke
a constitutional crisis." "Realistically considered Schechter has been put in the museum
of constitutional history."). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 452 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting), where it was said that the delegation holding of the Schechter
case has been effectively overruled. The decision of course involved a wartime statute.
The majority in Yakus, however, in distinguishing Schechter, observed that in that case
"[t]he function of formulating the codes was delegated, not to a public official responsible
to Congress or the Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the industries to be
regulated." Id. at 424. Schechter was relied upon in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Harlan in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963). It was approvingly referred
to in National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974), for the
proposition that Congress should not be presumed to have delegated the taxing power
conferred on it by U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 556 (1975), permitting a delegation to Indian tribal councils of authority to
enact ordinances, subject to approval of the Secretary of the Interior, excluding certain
transactions between Indians and non-Indians from a federal criminal statute. The limi-
tations on delegation were held to be "less stringent in cases where the entity exercising
the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter."
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doctrine remains with us, masquerading under various aliases-"equal
protection" and "due process," to name only two. Consider the follow-
ing disquieting developments.
First, the nondelegation doctrine still merits sporadic attention in
the Supreme Court, although no majority has yet held it applicable.
The most conspicuous recent example is the concurring opinion of
Justice Brennan, joined in by Justices Douglas and Marshall, in
McGautha v. California.° There, the three justices would have in-
validated, partly on delegation grounds, a statute permitting a jury to
fix the death penalty without guidelines from the legislature.1' In ad-
dition, the recent resuscitation of Schechter in National Cable Televi-
sion Association v. United States 2 indicates a potential revival of the
doctrine at the federal level under proper conditions.
Second, nondelegation remains a vital issue at the state level. Carter
is still enthusiastically cited by state courts,'" and the doctrine has played
a role in cases involving issues as diverse as public employee labor re-
lations" and environmental law.'
Third, several recent cases decided on "state acton"grounds might
The delegation doctrine has also occasionally been involved i i cases where criminal
prosecutions are at issue. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 298 (1958)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); see also
Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 69-71 (1961), and notes
336-37 infra. See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 272 nn.21-22 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) citing a number of cases and Jaffe, supra note 2, for the proposition that
"due process places limits on the manner and extent to which a state legislature may
delegate to others powers which the legislature might admittedly exercise itself." The
opinion, purportedly relying on K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.00 to
2.00-6 (Supp. 1970), further asserts a new form of "incorpor-.tionist" doctrine-that
"precisely the same functions are performed by the Due Process Clause" of the four-
teenth amendment with respect to the states as are performed by the constitutional
separation of powers and the due process clause of the fifth amendment with respect to
the federal government. 402 U.S. at 273 n.23. It should be noted that McGautha, Loui-
siana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), and Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399
(1966), involved delegation of adjudication or licensing powers, and not delegation of
rulemaking powers. Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); cf. also
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S.
345, 352 (1974).
10402 U.S. 183, 248, 272 (1971).
11 Id. at 272 n.22; see note 9 supra.
12415 U.S. 336 (1974).
13 Coming Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 361 (Mass. 1973)
(nonsigner clause); Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13,
97 Cal. Rptr. 431, 439 (1971) ; General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635
(1956) (nonsigner clause). See also Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., Inc., 285
N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974). See notes 174-215 infra & text accompanying.
14 See note 119 infra.
15 Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431
(1971) (statute delegating to timber owners power to formulate forest practice rules
with force of law an unlawful delegation).
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just as easily have relied on the delegation doctrine." If certain con-
duct may be labelled "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there is often equal room for nondelegation to operate. That
courts presently prefer equal protection rationales is no guarantee they
will forever continue to do so.
Thus the time has come for a thorough reexamination of the non-
delegation doctrine: its scope, applicability, and limitations. This article
will attempt to demonstrate first, that a per se doctrine precluding delega-
tion of legislative powers to private persons is not needed and would have
unfortunate results; second, that the decided Supreme Court cases do
not constitutionally impose such a doctrine; and third, that the numerous
16 The distinctions between a deprivation of due process or equal protection, and an
unlawful delegation of legislative power are often obscure. Thus it is not surprising that
the Court in Carter held that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 contained an
improper delegation of legislative power, and as such deprived petitioners of "rights safe-
guarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 298 U.S. at 311.
The shift in the focus of concern regarding state-sanctioned concentrations of pri-
vate power is nothing short of astonishing. In 1961, objection was voiced over such mat-
ters as compulsory union membership, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (exempting certain marketing agreements and concomitant
price-fixing from antitrust scrutiny), and nonsigner clauses sanctioned by various fair
trade laws. Hanslowe, Regulation by Visible Public and Invisible Private Government,
40 TEXAS L. REv. 88, 101, 103, 110 (1961).
More recently, well-known developments in constitutional law have shifted attention
to state-sanctioned power vested in creditors, public utilities, and the like. Based upon
decisions such as Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), several lower courts were prepared to hold that all prejudg-
ment seizures or suspensions of property interests violated the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. See, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.
1972) ; Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ; Jones Press,
Inc. v. Motor Travel Servs., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970). But see Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 562 (1974) ; see also 35 LA. L. REv. 221 (1974). Of course,
a basic problem in any of these cases is a finding of "state action." Some courts held that
statutory authorization of certain practices such as self-help repossession constituted
sufficient state action in itself, even though no state official was directly involved in the
seizure or retention. See, e.g., Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146,
520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) (statute authorizing garageman's liens). Clearly,
if courts are willing to find state action under such circumstances, definite parallels to the
former abuses of the delegation doctrine exist. It may not be too much to say that the
due process and equal protection clauses have in recent years been doing some of the
work formerly done by the delegation doctrine. For a characterization of one theory
of state action in terms of delegation, see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Be-
yond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 377-83 (1973). Cf. 2
F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 574-78 (2d ed. 1968).
Cf. also City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 79 Misc. 2d 676, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct.
1974); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d
206 (1969) ; Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention
of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REv. 260, 284-85 (1969).
In Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 328, 330-31 n.14 (1975), the author contrasts the meaning of
"state action" in antitrust and fourteenth amendment contexts.
For a discussion of the relationship between the delegation doctrine and the equal
protection clause, see notes 47-49 infra & text accompanying.
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decided cases in lower courts demonstrate both the practical nonexistence
of a per se rule against such delegations and the undesirability of such a
rule. An attempt will be made in conclusion to define the appropriate
contours of a more limited nondelegation doctrine.
Structurally, this article will follow in part the organization of
Professor Jaffe's definitive 1937 work on the doctrine.' The goal is
to update the analysis of the older cases, and to discuss the developments
which have transpired in almost 40 years since Jaffe addressed the
subject. Hopefully, the result will be guidance for courts and the bar,
who may be forced to reacquaint themselves with an aspect of American
constitutional law long thought moribund.
II. INAPPROPRIATENESS OF AN UNQUALIFIED
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
In recent years, the use of "state action" and antitrust doctrines
to control concentrations of private power has led both scholars' and
state courts" to view with a jaundiced eye legislative acts which confer
additional powers on private persons. Commentators have assured us
that the powers wielded by private groups constitute an unprecendented
menace to liberty and democracy," and have urged new departures
in constitutional law as means of controlling these groups.'
As mentioned, it is the thesis of this article that the revived use
of the Carter rule is neither demanded by recent developments in "state
action" doctrine nor compatible with them. For as Professor Jaffe
noted 38 years ago,
[P]articipation in law-making by private groups under explicit
statutory "delegation" does not stand . . . in absolute contra-
diction to the traditional process and conditions of law-malcing;
it is not incompatible with the conception of law. . . . [I]t
institutionalizes a factor in law-making that we have, eagerly in
fact, attempted to obscure.22
17 Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as Jaffe].
18 See Wirtz, Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953) ; Hanslowe,
supra note 16; Conant, Resale Price Maintenance: Constitu,ionality of Nonsigner
Clauses, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 545-50 (1961); cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,
878 =i1 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19 See generally 1 K. DAvis, ADZtiNIsTRATIW LAW TREATISE i 2.14 (1958) and cases
there cited.
20 E.g., Wirtz, supra note 18; Hanslowe, supra note 16.
21 Wirtz, supra note 18, at 132-35. For a discussion of the relationship between
"state action" in recent due process and equal protection cases and in the delegation doc-
trine, see note 16 supra.
22 Jaffe at 220-21.
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The "state action" cases reflect an increasing tendency on the part
of courts to look at substance rather than form when engaged in
preventing the arbitrary and oppressive use of private power. Yet
courts still are alarmed by the forms of delegation, no matter how
small the potentialities for oppression or abuse. Where statutes dele-
gating power are upheld, courts frequently justify their decisions by
maintaining that no power has been delegated, or by asserting that the
statute was complete when it left the legislature and the ensuing acts
of private parties are merely "but facts in contemplation of which
[the statute] was enacted,' 23 or by finding that adequate standards
exist,2 even though standards are usually only meaningful as guide-
lines for a disinterested administrator. But realism demands that courts
look in the second case, as in the first, to the nature of the power
exercised, the political forces which operate to check its abuse, and the
extent to which abuse of the power will oppress the persons on whom
it is directly imposed. This is in fact what courts frequently do, but
they vindicate unobjectionable statutes by finding that no delegation
is present, rather than by holding the delegation permissible. There
seems little justification in practice for continued adherence to a fictiti-
ous per se rule against delegation to private parties. Save where the
delegation is so broad that the legislature cannot retrieve what it has
delegated,2" pronouncement upon a delegation question deals with the
effects of a legislative act and not any alteration of legislative power.
The action courts take in "state action" (and increasingly in anti-
trust) cases is limited in scope: they do not condemn as unconstitu-
tional the existence of power in private groups, but merely impose upon
them duties of fairness consistent with the public function, and have
limited themselves in some measure by the traditional canons of judicial
restraint which also govern their willingness to invalidate statutes.
23 Weco Prods. Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 484, 274 N.W. 426, 430 (1937)
(Wisconsin Fair Trade Act "complete" on leaving legislature).
24 Note, Delegation of Power to Private Parties, 37 CoLum. L. REv. 447, 453 (1937).
See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 287 (Me. 1973). Cf. H.
FRIENDLY: THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINI-
TION OF STANDARDS 21-22 (1962) ; Landis, Book Review, 30 U. CHL L. REv. 597 (1963).
25 Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ; Ehmke,
Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 50 (1961). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen of
N. America v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). It could scarcely be asserted
that delegations to private groups are, for constitutional purposes, not subject to revoca-
tion. That view might have found favor in the Dartmouth College case and in other early
decisions under the contract clause; other cases are emphatic in stressing the inalienability
of the police power. See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Home
of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869).
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Courts have proved willing to invalidate statutes (and find state action)
in first amendment cases where the continuance of the political process
is itself thought to be in danger" and to act to preserve traditional
guarantees of fair trial and fair procedure.2" The disenfranchisement
or economic "exploitation" of minorities has more recently supplied
another justification for judicial unwillingness to defer to the political
will as reflected in legislative act or legislative inaction. Beyond this
courts have been loath to go. Economic due process continues to
slumber;" despite the urgings of some, constitutional guarantees have
not been applied to significantly limit the acts of corporations" and
labor unions.2
Delegation cases, unlike "state action" cases, moreover, involve
not legislative inaction but a clear policy choice by the legislature;
courts may thus properly display greater reluctance to restrict private
power that exists as a result of legislative choice, as has long been
manifest in connection with delegation of powers not legislative in
character. Legal historians remind us of the long-standing delegations
of eminent domain powers,2 and of the use of tax powers for the
SE.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; but see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
27 Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See also cases cited note 16 supra; see
also note 162 infra & text accompanying.
28 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
see note 16 supra. That Shelley is an equal protection and not a nondelegation case is
made plain by the fact that the Court did not dispute that restricive convenants utilizing
nonprohibited classifications remain enforceable save as prohibited by statute. See Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 329 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). Cf. Comment, Validity
Rules Concerning Public Zoning and Private Covenants: A Comparison and Critique, 39
S. CAL. L. REv. 409 (1966).
20 Cf. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 34. Cf. also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
30 Compare Berle, The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CH. L.
REV. 639 (1952), with Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
31 Compare Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REv.
620 (1958), with Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and Governmental Ac-
tion, 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961). But cf. note 16 supra.32 See generally J. HusT, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM1 IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTCUY UNITED STATES 63-66 (1956) and authoritie3 there cited. Cf. the
early statutes allowing mill owners to flood neighboring lands up n payment of compen-
sation to landowners, collected and upheld in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9
(1885); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174 (1888) (upholding grant
of eminent domain powers to railroads) ; Berman v. Parker, 343 U.S. 26 (1954) (up-
holding use of eminent domain powers where land conveyed to private developers). In
the last case, the Court declared:
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the me :ns by which it will
be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is
the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue
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benefit of private individuals.3 The "public use" limitation has been
all but read out of the fifth amendment," while the recent rash of
local Industrial Development Authorities 5 remind us that the day of
Loan Association v. Topeka36 is no more. Despite Adam Smith,3 7 the
federal constitution, unlike those of many states, contains no interdic-
tion against state-created monopolies, 5 as the rhetoric of the court in
that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of
another businessman. . . . The public end may be as well or better served
through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of govern-
ment-or so the Congress might conclude.
Id. at 33-34. Cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); IAM v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1961); Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596, 602 (1935);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
33 See C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); McAllister, Public Pur-
pose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 137, 241 (1930) ; McBain, Taxation for a Private
Purpose, 29 POL. ScI. Q. 185 (1914); Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A
Discussion of Problems Related to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 VA. L. REv. 255 (1949).
Leading cases include Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Cochran
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) ; Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233
(1920) ; Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917). Since taxation, like the regula-
tion of money and credit, is felt by the community at large, there is more reason to be-
lieve that political checks will be adequate to control it than exists in the case of eminent
domain or even in the case of ordinary exercises of the police power. See Pinsky, State
Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic
Approach, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 265, 307 (1963).
84 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ; Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County
in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV.
63.
s5A representative enabling statute is the Indiana Local Industrial Development
Act, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-7-14-1 to -10 (Code ed. 1974).
a6 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875) (invalidating as outside the powers of the legisla-
ture under the Kansas constitution a statute empowering a municipal authority to issue
bonds in aid of manufacturing concerns).
37A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. 10 (1776), is of course the classic de-
nunciation of state monopoly grants. This antipathy did not always exist at the time the
constitution was framed. See American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,
335 U.S. 538, 543 n.1 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and the works there cited.
The only reference to monopolies in the Federal Constitution is that in art. I, § 8, cl. 8
empowering Congress "[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . ." Since this clause is supplemented by the commerce
power, it does not operate as a restriction on federal power to grant monopolies other
than patents and copyright. It may however have a negative thrust against state legisla-
tion in areas closely related to patent and copyright, at least where such legislation
can be viewed as conflicting with federal patent and copyright statutes enacted pursuant
to the constitutional authorization. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964). The above abortive efforts of several states to amend the commerce clause prior
to its ratification to forbid congressional grants of monopolies are briefly discussed in
F. FRAN:FURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 12-13
(1937). On monopolies and the fourteenth amendment, see the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (including the dissenting opinion of Justice Field), and
their sequel, Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884) (involving
the same slaughterhouse monopoly). See generally C. FAiRMAN, MR. JUSTIcE MILLER
AND THE SUPREME COURT ch. 8 (1939).
38 But cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), where the equal protection clause
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the Noerr" case under the antistrust laws reminds vs, nor, indeed, does
it prohibit delegations of legislative power. The restrictions, such as
they are, on delegations to administrative agencies stem from notions
relating to separation of powers not necessarily relevant where a dele-
gation is to private groups."0
This is not to say that scope may not remain for circumspect use
of the nondelegation doctrine. But its use should be restricted to the
three great areas where the judicial activism inherent in declarations
of unconstitutionality has most frequently been exercised. Where a
delegation by virtue of its content or breadth calls into question the
future operation of the political process, judicial scrutiny seems war-
ranted. Also, where it relates to powers not legislatve but judicial, and
thus trenches on historic notions of fair hearing and fair trial, scrutiny
seems warranted, particularly since judicial and licensing determina-
tions are not readily subject to legislative correction. Finally, there
may be scope for condemnation of delegations which operate against
the interest of minorities disenfranchised in respect of the election
of the legislature which authorized the delegation, though this limita-
tion ought not to inspire acquiescence in the extravagant rhetoric of
those who speak in terms of "disenfranchised" consumers4 and thus
render nugatory canons of restraint.
was perhaps used for a similar purpose. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 46-47
(1958). Cf. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 52.1, 545 (1949) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ; Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), for
the rejection of what might have been efforts to use the commerce clause to invalidate
state monopoly grants. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Whcit.) 1 (1824).
It seems well established that the equal protection clause imposes few barriers in the
way of monopoly grants through the device of "grandfather clauses." See Brooks v.
State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 233 Md. 98, 195 A.2d 728 (1963), and
cases there discussed. Cf. also United States v. Maryland Say. Share Ins. Corp., 400
U.S. 4 (1970); Wampler v. Lecompte, 282 U.S. 172 (1930). One commentator, at least,
would have it do so. See Sharp, The Old Constitution, 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 529, 534
(1953). Cf. In re Norwalk Call, 62 Cal. 2d 185, 397 P.2d 426, -4 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1964).
Any requirement of uniformity of application will of course impair the political feasi-
bility of innovation, legislative or judicial. See Johnson v. N,:w Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
'(1966).
-0 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135,
136-37 (1961), discussed at note 149 infra & text accompanying. But cf. Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962).
40 Perhaps the language of Justice Cardozo in another context is pertinent to a dis-
cussion of the doctrine: "Appeal is vaguely made to some constitutional immunity,
whether express or implied is not stated with distinctness. . . If the immunity vests
upon some express provision of the Constitution, the opinion of the Court does not point
us to the article or section." Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dis-
senting).
'11 E.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Suprenic Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34; Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50
CALIr. L. REv. 381 (1962). Compare the more robust view taken in K. LLEWELLYN,
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The principle relating to breadth of delegations has been most
actively delineated in the present federal law relating to delegations
of rulemaking power to public bodies,42 though the absence of the
checks supplied by the appropriation and appointment powers and the
lack of the self-imposed restraint resulting from public officers' oaths
may be thought to justify a more rigorous application of the doctrine
so as to confine to narrower limits the scope of powers conferrable
upon private persons. Yet many of the vices thought to be inherent in
delegation to private groups constitute violations of express constitu-
tional mandates-particularly the requirements of due process and
equal protection. Reliance on a general nondelegation principle to
remedy all such violations would be inappropriate, but the proximity
of the nondelegation principle to other constitutional safeguards de-
serves examination.
Historic notions of fairness and the difficulty of legislative correc-
tion may seem to justify a per se rule against delegation of judicial or
licensing powers,43 at least where inadequate review is provided. But
the applicable constitutional provision here is the due process clause,
not a vague "nondelegation" doctrine. Disqualification for pecuniary
JURISPRUDENCE 241-42 (1962):
When action by the specialists on a point of constitutional change pinches the
personal toes of Albert Jones too sharply, Albert is likely to react as he does
to less fundamental change of similar effect . . . If only one of an unorgan-
ized class or ruck, he groans and gets nowhere, unless the pressure is painful
and sustained enough to lock his fellows and himself together into an interested
group.
42 See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15, at 150-51 (1958). There
are no significant constitutional requirements as to procedure in rulemaking: "In absence
of statutory requirement of hearing, and in absence of a dispute of adjudicative facts,
the case law ordinarily does not require either a speech-making hearing or a trial-type
hearing for rule making." Id. § 6.12, at 405.
42 One may surmise that even now the most perceptive courts are motivated
much more by the degree of protection against arbitrariness than by the doc-
trine about standards that they write about in their opinions. . . . By and
large, the safeguards required for adjudication are greater than those required
for general rule making.
Id. § 2.15, at 151.
The lawyer's chief concern with "the rule of law" was earlier considered to
be that of setting out procedural safeguards to insure nonarbitrary solution to
the problems of the individual. . . . When a city council, nominally a legisla-
tive body, passes zoning regulations, grants variations therefrom, provides for
slum clearance, and does numerous other acts which affect directly individuals,
it affects them in much the same way that an administrator does. The courts
do often indiscriminately apply the same rules when both of these categories of
actions are questioned, but speak in different terms when general ordinances af-
fecting all persons in the area are considered.
J. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN AREA
PROBLEMS 147 (1961) (footnote omitted).
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bias has at times been used as a substitute for a doctrine barring delega-
tion of judicial powers;4 however, the "rule of necessity" may fre-
quently operate to render this solution inadequate." Controversies in
this area thus do and should turn on where the line between judicial
and legislative function falls. 6
The fact that every delegation of legislative authority involves a
nexus with state power may justify application of equal protection
standards to the content of rules made by private parties when the
courts are invoked to enforce these rules: "jurisdiction always is juris-
diction only to decide constitutionally."47  If delegation of judicial
powers to private parties is to be barred, application of equal protec-
tion standards to delegated legislation would seem warranted, since
the equal protection clause, taken in its narrowest meaning, 8 may be
regarded as a prohibition against adjudication under the guise of
legislation somewhat akin to the constitutional prohibition against
bills of attainder. 9
4 E.g., Smith v. Department of Regis. & Educ., 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722 (1952).
4 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 42, § 12.04.
4 Cf. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 209 (1950); quoted in Kurland,
Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961):
[C]lassification in abstract terms can always be carried to the point at which
, " * the class singled out consists only of particular knov, n persons or even a
single individual. . . . [N]o entirely satisfactory criterion has been found that
would always tell us what kind of classification is compatible with equality be-
fore the law.
Compare Peery v. Virginia Bd. of Funeral Directors & Fmbzklmers, 203 Va. 161, 123
S.E.2d 94 (1961), with In re Mayor of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, [In re Elm St.] 158
N.E. 24 (1927) (Cardozo, C.J.).
47 Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1402 (1953), rcprinted in P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. VECHSLER, HART AND WEcHSLEI,'s THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 330, 360 (2d ed. 1973). Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972).
48 Note the conflicting views taken in the opinions in Douglas v. California 372 U.S.
353 (1963); cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consiitutilonal Law, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
49See City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 79 Misc. 2d 676, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct.
1974). Cf. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) :
Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power. It must not
be a special rule for a particular person or particular case . . thus excluding,
as not due process of law, acts of attainder, bills of pains zd penalties, acts of
confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly tr.,nsferring one man's
estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other . . . arbitrary
exertions of power under the forms of legislation.
It may be noted that for Justice Frankfurter many cases which for others involved
problems under substantive clauses resolved themselves into qucstions of procedural due
process. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 121 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 322, 328-29 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); F. FRANxFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 14-15 (1956).
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III. HISTORICAL QUALIFICATION OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The zoning intervention case of Eubank v. City of Richmond,
already described,"0 was shortly followed by Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago.5 There the Court, under the influence of traditional
property law concepts, upheld a similar state statute phrased in terms
of consent rather than objection, declaring that the provision allowing
lifting of the zoning prohibition by consent "is not a delegation of legis-
lative power, but is . . . a familiar provision affecting the enforce-
ment of laws and ordinances."52 Here, the inroad upon the doctrine
was perceived as shielded by tradition. The vitality of the non-
delegation doctrine per se was later attested to, however, by the subse-
quent invalidation of a similar consent ordinance in the Roberge"8 case,
where the Court observed: "There is no provision for review under
the ordinance; [the neighbors'] failure to give consent is final. They
. . . are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrar-
ily . . . ." Cusack was distinguished on the basis that "the [prohibited
uses] . . . were liable to endanger . . . safety and decency .... "
The vehement rhetoric in the Schechter case directed at the specific
delegations to code authorities gave the doctrine added force.
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate
its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups
so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise
and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade
or industries? . . . The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of
legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress."
In Schechter, however, the Court did admit the possibility of some
lawful delegations to private persons. The opinion distinguished
[i]nstances . . . in which Congress has availed itself of such
assistance; as e. g., in the exercise of its authority over the
public domain, with respect to the recognition of local customs or
rules of miners as to mining claims, or, in matters of a more or less
technical nature, as in designating the standard height of draw-
bars.5"
The decisive factor for Justice Cardozo, whose concurring opinion
has probably better stood the test of time, was the presence of
50 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
51242 U.S. 526 (1917).
52 Id. at 531.
53 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928).
54A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
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an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any
class or group of acts identified or described by reference to a
standard. Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into
evils and upon discovery correct them.'(
Narrower delegations to private groups would apparently be valid, at
least if subject to presidential approval-an approval which Cardozo
recognized would be formal at best.
Delegation in such circumstances is born of the necessities of the
occasion. . . . Nor is the substance of the power changed
because the President may act at the instance of trade or industrial
associations having special knowledge of the facts. Their func-
tion is strictly advisory; it is the imprinatur of the President that
begets the quality of law.5 7
But imprimatur and authorship are very different things.
This isolated grappling with real issues had little influence on the
Supreme Court's later delegation decisions. In Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.,"8 a federal statute making maximum hours and minimum wages
agreed upon by a majority of miners and producers of two-thirds of the
annual national tonnage of coal binding on the remainder was held in-
valid, the delegation doctrine serving as an alternate ground:
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the
power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is
legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively dis-
interested, but to private persons whose interests may be and
often are adverse to the interest of others in the same business. 59
55 Id. (footnotes omitted). The mining statute referred to was the Act of July 26,
1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251. It had been upheld by way of dictum in Butte City Water
Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905). The railroad drawbar statute was the Act of
Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531. It had been applied and by inference upheld in St.
Louis & Iron Mt. & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 286 (1908).
56 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring). See Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butchers Workmen of N. America v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
57 295 U.S. at 552 (Cardozo, J., concurring). Justice Cardozo at this point in his
opinion cited Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64, 71 (1935), where the Court, speaking through
Cardozo, upheld a Mississippi statute empowering a state superintendent of banks, with
court concurrence, to reopen closed banks where 75 percent of the depositors had signed
"freezing-of-deposits agreements" providing for deferred return of their deposits. Cf.
United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232 (1934), rejecting a challenge
under the equal protection clause to a statute requiring the assent of 25 percent of mort-
gage holders to obtain a summary foreclosure decree.
68 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
59M. at 311. One commentator has contended that the delegation holding rested on
"the indefiniteness of the group" to which power was delegated, and that its sweeping
language is "dictum." Note, The Disqualification of Administraive Officials, 41 CoLum.
L. REv. 1384, 1398 n.79 (1941).
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The ban on delegation sprang from the fifth amendment due process
clause," and not, as Justice Harlan was later to assume," from abstract
doctrines about the vesting of legislative power having their source in
article I.
The Court in Carter thus may have departed somewhat from its
earlier position in Schechter, where it laid stress upon "the prerogatives
and duties of Congress." It may also have departed from its position in
Booth v. Indiana." In that case, a state statute requiring coal operators
to install washrooms upon request of 20 or more employees was held
valid against a delegation challenge, the Court observing that "[t]he
Supreme Court of the State decided that the law could be called into
operation by petition, and in the decision no Federal question is in-
volved." 3 The choice of the fifth amendment due process clause in
Carter might suggest that article I notions impose no per se ban on
federal delegations to private parties, which are to be judged by the
more flexible criterion of due process. But Carter may also suggest
that such constitutional restrictions as may exist apply equally to the
states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment-a result which would
not obtain if the prohibition found its source in article I.
Since the fifth amendment was used, the restriction on delegation
in federal statutes may be thought less severe than it otherwise could
be. However, the Court cited Schechter, Eubank, and Roberge, and
observed that "it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of
this court which foreclose the question."' " The concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Hughes appeared to find limitations on delegation in article
I as well as the fifth amendment:
Such a provision, apart from the mere question of the delegation
of legislative power, is not in accord with the requirement of
due process of law which under the Fifth Amendment dominates
the regulations which Congress may impose. 5
The fiction of nondelegability was adhered to in the Old Dearborn
60 See Jefferson, The Supreme Court and State Separation and Delegation of
Powers, 44 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1944).61 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 855 (1961) (concurring opinion).
62237 U.S. 391 (1915).
63 Id. at 397. It is usually thought that, subject to the limitations imposed by pro-
cedural due process, the states are free to distribute their powers among public bodies as
they see fit. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615
n.13 (1974); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 272 n.21 (1971) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (dictum) ; .Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902); Forsyth v.
Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897).64 298 U.S. at 311.
65 Id. at 318.
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case,r' where the Court, influenced again by familiar property and
contract doctrines, upheld the provision of the Illinois Fair Trade Act
requiring persons with notice of manufacturer-retailer price main-
tenance contracts to adhere to the prices established in them, even where
such persons did not assent to the terms of the contracts-a form of
delegated rulemaking power. The Court distinguished Eubank, Roberge,
and Carter:
In those cases the property affected had been acquired without
any preExisting restriction in respect of its use or disposition ...
Here, the restriction, already imposed with the knowledge of
appellants, ran with the acquisition and conditioned it.67
Mr. Justice Jackson, among others, was to be puzzled by the differing
results reached by Justice Sutherland in Carter and Old Dearborn.
"Taken together, the decisions suggest that the labor provisions of the
Coal Act were 'obnoxious' not so much to the Constitution as to the
judicial sense of what was good for the business community."68
In Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew,"' the Court declined to
make clear whether a state statute delegating rulemaking power could
be invalidated on the basis of the nondelegation doctrine. There a
Virginia statute set up a state milk marketing board with authority to
fix minimum rates. The Court, echoing Booth, emphatically rejected
the challenge to this delegation. "The statute challenged as invalid is
one adopted by a state. This removes objections that might be worthy
of consideration if we were dealing with an act of Congress.""' But
the statute also provided for cancellation of minimum price regulations
upon petition of a majority of the producers affected. As to this power
to repeal, the Court was more ambivalent.
Delegation to official agencies is one thing, there being nothing
in the concept of due process to require that a particular agency
shall have a monopoly of power; delegation to private interests or
unofficial groups with arbitrary capacity to make their will prevail
as law may be something very different ...
61 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). A
number of commentators have asserted that the Old Dearborn case, on its facts, did not
uphold a "nonsigner clause" since the defendant there had signed a contract, though the
court treated it as ineffective. Id. at 187. It is sufficient to observe that no contract was
present in the companion cases of McNeil v. Joseph Triner Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936),
and Pep Boys, Inc. v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
67299 U.S. at 194. Cf. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S.
251 (1931).
138 R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 164 (1941).
so 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
70 Id. at 612.
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Without acceptance or rejection of the distinction in its applica-
tion to this statute, we think it is enough to say that the power of
cancellation has not been exercised or even threatened.
7 1
In Currin v. Wallace,"2 decided in 1939, the Supreme Court upheld
a statute empowering the Secretary of Agriculture to establish markets
for the inspection and certification of tobacco, no such market to be
established "unless two-thirds of the growers, voting at a prescribed
referendum, favor it."7  The Court, citing Cusack, observed that
"Congress has merely placed a restriction upon its own regulation by
withholding its operation as to a given market 'unless two-thirds of the
growers voting favor it.' "7 Carter was distinguished as a case "where
a group of producers may make the law and force it upon a minority,"
75
while Roberge was disposed of largely on the basis that the zoning
regulation there was beyond the police power: "[A] prohibition of
an inoffensive and legitimate use of property . . . imposed not by the
legislature but by other property owners .... 71
Similar conclusions were reached in the case of United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc.7 7 The Court followed Currin v. Wallace
in upholding the statute, and was undisturbed by the fact that a single
cooperative league, empowered to vote on behalf of its members, was
able to cast over half the votes counted in the referendum: "[I]nas-
much as Congress could place the Order in effect without any vote,
it is permissible for it to provide for approval or disapproval in such
way or manner as it may choose."7 "
71 Id. at 614.
72306 U.S. 1 (1939).
73 Id. at 6.
74 Id. at 15.
75 Id.
7o Id. at 16.
77 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
78 Id. at 578. "Of 38,627 votes counted as valid in the referendum, 33,663 or 87.1
percent were in favor of the issuance of the Order and 4,964 or 12.9 percent were op-
posed. Of the favorable votes, the League cast 22,287." Id. at 557. See also H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 735 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("J. G. Boswell Co. commands the greatest number of votes, 37,825, which are enough
to give it a majority of the board of directors."). In upholding such distributions of
voting power in water districts, the Supreme Court noted in a companion case:
We cannot agree with the dissent's intimation that the Wyoming Legisla-
ture has in any sense abdicated to a wealthy few the ultimate authority over
land management in that State. The statute authorizing the establishment of
improvement districts was enacted by a legislature in which all of the State's
electors have the unquestioned right to be fairly represented. Under the act,
districts may be formed only as subdivisions of soil and water conservation dis-
tricts. . . . And a precondition to their formation referendum is a determina-
tion by a board of supervisors of the affected conservation district, popularly
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In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,"9 the Court upheld,
on the authority of Currin v. Wallace, a statute setting up industry
boards each empowered "on its own' motion or when directed by the
[public] Commission" to propose minimum prices 'which "may be ap-
proved, disapproved, or modified by the Commission." The prices thus
set were applicable to code members alone, but a 19,2' percent tax was
imposed on non-code-members. The opinion of Justice Douglas took
the view that "[t]he members of the code function subordinately to
the Commission. . . . Since law-making is not intrusted to the in-
dustry, this statutory scheme is unquestionably valid.""0 The Court did
not rely on the facade of voluntarism that the option of paying the
tax in place of price regulation might have been thought to supply.
In Parker v. Brown,8 it was not felt necessary even to discuss
the delegation problem when the Court upheld a California statute, the
effectiveness of which was conditioned on both initiation of action by
private persons and a referendum of producers following pro forma
approval by the state, thus reducing the Carter doctrine to a hollow
shell. Yet this result was achieved without once directly questioning
the proposition that legislative power could not be delegated to private
persons, and later cases have likewise upheld delegations sub silentio.8"
elected by both occupiers and owners of land within the district, that the water-
shed improvement district is both necessary and administra.tively practicable.
Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 744-45
(1973). In the Salyer case, mipra, it was noted that the scheme there at issue required
the concurring approval of the State Treasury, the State Department of Water Re-
sources, a majority of landowners voting in an tmweighted election, and a weighted
majority.
79 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
80 Id. at 399.
81317 U.S. 341 (1943). The statute was upheld against challenges based on the
Sherman Act and commerce clause. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 176 n.19 (1963) ; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199 (1939). In
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court upheld a Washington
minimum wage statute under which wage scales could be promulgated by a public board
only after recommendations by a conference constituted on a principle of interest repre-
sentation. See also Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S.
126 (1941).
82Thus in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), the
Supreme Court upheld a statute vesting licensing powers in a board consisting entirely
of river pilots, and providing that the board should license only persons who had served
a six month apprenticeship as river pilots. Four judges dissentcd on equal protection
grounds. A newer challenge to the statute involved in Kotch was similarly unsuccessful.
See Brechtel v. Board of Examiners of Bay Pilots, 230 F. Supp. 18 (D. La. 1964);
accord, Register v. Milam, 188 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1966).
Another indication of the shifting scope of the doctrine is illvstrated by the fate of
Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 181-82 (1962), sustaining as not in
conflict with the federal bankruptcy act a state statute allowing judgment creditors of
motorists involved in automobile accidents to initiate the suspension and consent to the
restoration of drivers' licenses. Kesler was overruled in Perez v, Campbell, 402 U.S.
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IV. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Statewide Referenda; Local Option
The conception of delegation of legislative power has been applied
in a large number of cases involving statewide referenda and local op-
tion elections. The cases do so largely under the compulsion of state
court precedents which in turn follow the remarkable early Delaware
case of Rice v. Foster.8" There the court observed:
[O]ur republican government was instituted by the consent of
the people. The characteristic which distinguishes it from the
miscalled republics of ancient and modern times, is, that none
of the powers of sovereignty are exercised by the people; but
all of them by separate, co-ordinate branches of government in
whom those powers are vested . . . . These co-ordinate branches
are intended to operate as balances, checks and restraints, not only
upon each other, but upon the people themselves; to guard them
against their own rashness, precipitancy, and misguided zeal;
and to protect the minority against the injustice of the majority."'
But what of the tyranny of legislative majorities, chosen by the
same electors that vote in a proposed referendum? To this question,
the court rejoined in the language of Burke's Address to the Electors
of Bristol: "The representative owes to his constituents, not only his
industry, but his judgment: and he betrays, instead of serving them,
if he sacrifices it to their opinions." 5 This proposition is clearly unex-
ceptionable. But the court went further, for the act in question involved
a prohibition statute. Might not a conscientious representative, with-
out violating Burke's precepts, conclude that the desirability of the
statute was itself a function of the public's attitude toward it? Later
experience attests to the wisdom of such a view, yet the court declined
to permit the statute to be conditioned on popular acceptance. "The
sovereign power . . . of this State, resides with the legislative, execu-
637, 651-52 (1971) ; see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), invalidating a related pro-
vision on procedural due process grounds.
An amusing sidelight to the delegation cases is provided by Helvering v. Lerner
Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941). There the court sustained a statute allowing
taxpayers to choose between alternate tax bases, holding it was not a delegation since
"Congress has fixed the criteria in light of which the choice is to be made [by the tax-
payer]." In Duhame v. State Tax Comm'n, 65 Ariz. 268, 179 P.2d 252 (1947) a similar
provision was upheld on the basis that the taxpayer "applied" the law rather than made
it. Surely the obvious observation to make in these cases is that the taxpayer is not
delegated the right to regulate anyone's conduct but his own.
s34 Del. (4 Harr.) 479 (1847).
84 Id. at 487.
85 2 E. BuRxE, Woaxs 89, 96 (7th ed. 1881), quoted in id. at 490.
[Vol. 50:650
DELEGATION TO PRIVATE PARTIES
tive, and judicial departments. Having thus transferred the sovereign
power, the people cannot resume or exercise any portion of it."88
It was of this case that Justice Holmes was to write, in a dissent-
ing opinion taking the opposite view,
The question is not whether the people of their own motion
could pass a law without any act of the Legislature. That no
doubt, whether valid or not, would be outside the Constitution.
So perhaps might be a statute purporting to confer the power
of making laws upon them. But the question . . . is whether an
act of the Legislature is made unconstitutional by a proviso that, if
rejected by the people, it shall not go into effect. If it does
go into effect, it does so by the express enactment of the repre-
sentative body. . . . I agree that the discretion of the Legislature
is intended to be exercised. I agree that confidence is put in it
as an agent. But I think that so much confidence is put in it that
it is allowed to exercise its discretion by taking the opinion of
its principal if it thinks that course to be wise. . . . The contrary
view seems to me an echo of Hobbes's theory that the surrender
of sovereignity by the people was final. I notice that the case from
which most of the reasoning against the power of the Legislature
has been taken by later decisions states that theory in language
which almost is borrowed from the Leviathan. . . . Hobbes
urged his notion in the interest of the absolute power of King
Charles I., and one of the objects of the Constitudion of Massa-
chusetts was to deny it. 8 7
1. Statewide Referenda
At the time that Professor Jaffe wrote in 1937, the majority of
courts persisted in a refusal to allow legislatures to condition the
passage of laws on statewide referenda," though a number of states
took Holmes' view. But practical needs led a large namber of states to
refuse to follow the early Delaware court in disallowing local option
elections ;"D indeed three states had been led to overrule earlier holdings
in order to validate such local referenda." And this was so even though
88 4 Del. (4 Harr.) at 488. Compare the similar Hobbesian view of the court in
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 124, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), with its proposi-
tion that a state cannot by delegating taxing and spending power.,- to local governments
produce results which it could not validly achieve through its own direct measures.
But cf. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, .4 n.110 (1973).
s7 Opinions of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 593, 594-95, [In re Municipal Suffrage to
Women] 36 N.E. 488, 491-92 (1894) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88 Cases from Alabama, California, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Texas. Contra, cases from Georgia, Michigan, Vermont, and Wisconsin
(dictum). See Jaffe at 222 nn. 45 & 46.
80 Valid: California, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania.
Void: Delaware, Iowa, Texas. Jaffe at 223 n.47.9o Id. The states were California, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
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from a purely formal standpoint there is less justification for delega-
tion by a legislature to voters of a county than there is for delegation
to the voters of a state. The second group, Jaffe points out, has con-
stitutional significance; the first does not." Indeed, the Delaware
court found an anomaly in allowing state law to be modified "by the will
of a majority of the citizens who voted in [a] county, although it
might be against the will of a majority of the citizens of the State ....92
Since Jaffe's article, developments in this branch of the doctrine
have been laggard. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reaffirmed its
adherence to the minority view upholding statewide referenda."3 The
Arkansas court upheld a statewide referendum by analogy to the local
option cases, thus joining the minority states." In addition, a number
of other states have begun whittling away at the majority rule although
continuing to pay lip service to it.9" In Oregon, the legislature has
been allowed to make the effectiveness of an act contingent upon the
rejection of another act at a referendum. 6 In Kentucky, where the
issuance of bonds is constitutionally subject to public approval, the
court has allowed a referendum on an act removing the interest limi-
tation on an issue of unsold bonds, pointing to the fact that the ques-
tion would not have arisen but for the public approval of the bond
issue itself.97 The Supreme Court of Alabama had reaffirmed its ad-
herence to the majority view, which applies in that state to tax ques-
tions only.98 However, Alabama has more recently taken a stance
similar to Oregon's in upholding a statute whose effectiveness was
contingent upon the adoption of a related constitutional amendment;
the latter required voter approval."9 Most telling is the recent decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in James v. Valtierra,"
91Id. at 224.
92 Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 491 (1847). See also Holmes, J., dissenting,
in Opinions of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 594, [In re Municipal Suffrage to Women] 36
N.E. 488, 492 (1894): "The objection [to constitutionality], if sound, would seem to
have equal force against all forms of local option. But I will consider the question when
it arises. The difference is plain between that case and one where the approval required
is that of the sovereign body."
93 State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W.2d 903 (1952).
94 Fulkerson v. Refunding Bd., 201 Ark. 957, 147 S.W.2d 980 (1941).
'
95 Busch v. Turner, 26 Cal. 2d 817, 161 P.2d 456 (1945); cf. Geiger v. Board of
Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 832, 313 P.2d 545 (1957); Application of Oklahoma Building
Bonds Comm'n, 410 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1966); Application of Oklahoma Indus. Fin. Auth.,
360 P.2d 720 (Okla. 1961).
9 Marr v. Fisher, 182 Ore. 383, 187 P.2d 966 (1947).
97 Walton v. Carter, 337 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. App. 1960).
98 In re Opinions of the Justices, 232 Ala. 56, 166 So. 706 (1936).
9 Opinion of the Justices, 287 Ala. 326, 251 So. 2d 744 (1971).
"D0 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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with its ringing dictum that "[p]rovisions for referendums demon-
strate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."
Valtierra may well have sounded the final doom of the Rice v. Foster
doctrine.
2. Local Option Laws
Virtually all state courts now recognize the validity of local option
laws. In addition to the six states listed by Professor Jaffe,""' 19 other
states have squarely upheld the validity of such acts.' The willingness
of the courts to uphold the local option is founded on what is perceived
to be a practical need for local approval of liquor and tax laws, the
courts taking the view that "the constitution itself 6oes not require the
impracticable or impossible."'" 3  In the language of an early New
Jersey case,
it has always been recognized as a legitimate part of the legis-
lative function, as well as a duty in harmony wi'ch the spirit of
our institutions, to enable the people, in whom all power ulti-
mately resides, to control the police powers in communities for
themselves.' 0'
There are still some limitations on local option elections, however.
The election acts are usually upheld on the theory that they are com-
plete statutes, the execution of which merely happens to be contingent
on a local event. Where, by an accident of draftsmanship, approval of
the act itself is made contingent on local acceptance, the courts may
follow the example of a Rhode Island decision which invalidated an
act which "in its present form does not purport to be a completed act
by the legislature in performance of its legislative function under the
constitution."' 0 5
In addition, some courts, such as those of Tcnnessee, invalidate
acts which depend on a single election for effectiveness, holding that
the act of a legislature is not complete unless it retains continuing
validity regardless of imrriediate approval.' By contrast, a Missouri
court upheld an enactment on the basis that
101 See note 89 supra.
'
0 2 See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 142 n.93 (1956) and cases there cited; id.
(Supp. 1974); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, Tna LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPCRATIONS § 4.08-.10 (3d
ed. F. Ellard 1966).
103 See Reynolds v. Dallas County, 203 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
10 Paul v. Gloucester County, 50 N.J.L. 585, 603-04, 15 A. 272, 280 (Ct Err. &
App. 1888).
105 Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 316, 328, 6 A.2d 147, 153 (1939).
o30 Halmontaller v. City of Nashville, 206 Tenn. 64, 332 SY.2d 163 (1960) (hold-
ing single elections invalid).
19751
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the statute does not delegate to the people the power to discon-
tinue and recreate the separate officers of recorder at pleasure, but
only permits them to vote on the question of joining the two
officers; and when there has been such joinder it would seem
the voting power of the people under the section is exhausted.2
0 7
Some traces of the earlier position remain. Thus a North Carolina
court invalidated a statute which allowed the voters of a town to au-
thorize a municipal racing commission to establish a racetrack outside
the town, the statute being regarded as an imposition on the residents
of the outlying district.0 8 But if the earlier reasoning is rejected, it
should not apply to this sort of case either, since a legislature in which
residents of the outlying district are represented has determined that
the construction of the track would not offend state policy, and has
merely conditioned its approval on ratification by the persons who are
to put up the funds. No licensing function is involved; if delegation
questions are made to run on the distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication, statutes which merely require popular assent to legislative
acts ought not to fall.
B. Creation of Special Districts
Many American statutes allow property owners to petition and
vote for the creation of special taxing districts, the boundaries of which
are defined by the petition.
Districts of this sort are created for a variety of reasons."0 The
special taxing district is a flexible device, and can be used to cut across
municipal lines which would otherwise inhibit the development of in-
tegrated services. In recent years, it has found increasing use in more
developed regions as a means of evading statutory or constitutional
municipal debt limits.
Where the districts are created by the act of a legislature, they are
constitutionally unassailable, even though the legislature may be giv-
ing mere pro forma approval to proposals by private parties. Where,
however, the petition/referendum device is authorized by statute, courts
have been concerned with protecting dissenting property owners within
the proposed district. Both due process and nondelegation doctrines
have been invoked to require that a hearing be given to dissenting
207 State ex inf. Crain ex rel. Peebles v. Moore, 339 Mo. 492, 501, 99 S.W.2d 17, 22
(1936).
08 State ex rel. Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d 390 (1954).
10 9 See M. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL Dismcrs: A SOLUTION TO THE METOPOLI-
TAN AREA PROBLEm (1962); Willoughby, The Quiet Alliance, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 72
(1965).
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property owners and that an official be vested with discretion to reject
districts that would be of no benefit to dissenting property owners'
lands. The Supreme Court in 1926 required such a procedure for due
process reasons:
Where a local improvement territory is selected, and the
burden is spread by the legislature . . . . the owners of property
in the district have no constitutional right to be heard on the ques-
tion of benefits. . . . But it is essential to due process of law
that such owners be given notice and opportunity to be heard on
that question where, as here, the district was not created by the
legislature, and there has been no legislative determination that
their property will be benefited by the local improvement."
The decision whether a particular landowner' property is to be
included within a district is thus properly regarded by the courts as
action partaking of the character of an adjudication, rather than an
exercise of rulemaking power, where the determination is made by
neighbors rather than by the representatives of the public at large."'
Though in early years courts were sometimes willing to uphold
the creation of special districts without a hearing when tax rates
charged in them were nominal,'12 this course of action has been fore-
closed by other decisions.113 Courts thus consistently strike down the
creation of districts when no safeguards are present. 14 But when
provision for hearing and discretionary disapproval is made, courts
have consistently upheld the creation of new districts."5  The sole
concern of the courts in most cases has been the protection of dissenting
property owners; considerations of general public policy rarely enter
into decisions.116 This approach seems appropriate in the light of the
110 Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1926). See Embree v. Kansas City
& Liberty 1Blvd. Road Dist., 240 U.S. 242 (1916).
111 Cf. text accompanying note 73 supra.
112 Davis v. State, 141 Ala. 84, 37 So. 454 (1904) (fencing district).
113 Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather Control Dist., 170 Neb. 46, 101
N.W.2d 748 (1960) (holding district invalid for lack of hearing though only one mill
tax). Cf. Syfie v. Tri-County Hosp. Dist., 186 Neb. 478, 184 N.W.2d 398 (1971).
114d. See also State ex reL Jones v. Brown, 338 Mo. 448, 92 S.W.2d 718 (1936);
Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961) (due process grounds).
115 See, e.g., Miller v. Ryan, 54 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1951) (adv(rtising district) ; Dortch
v. Lugar, 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25 (1971) ; Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy Dist,
238 Ind. 502, 153 N.E.2d 125 (1958) (conservation district); Evans v. West Norriton
Twp. Mun. Auth., 370 Pa. 150, 87 A.2d 474 (1952) (pure strewn authority); Branch v.
Salt Lake County Serv. Area No. 2-Cottonwood Hts., 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814
(1969) (County Service Area Act). In Kriz v. Klingensmith, 176 Neb. 205, 125 N.W.2d
674 (1964), discretion in the county board to reject a district was held sufficient to sustain
the statute, though no notice or hearing was provided for. The court held that no hear-
ing was requisite until an actual assessment was sought to be irnposed.
116 But see State ex -el. Attorney-General v. County School Bd., 181 Miss. 818, 181
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analysis of the delegation doctrine developed above.
It might seem appropriate for courts to use substantive due process
doctrines to hold that the general enabling statutes must direct the
courts to make some inquiry into the bona fides of a district as a political
organ, as well as into whether the use of district funds will benefit the
total area encompassed within a district, for in many cases the creation
of special districts has been approved even though the use of the
device may be oppressive to the interests of future residents and bond-
holders.117 In approaching the problems presented by new districts,
courts frequently assume attitudes redolent of the spirit of the old
frontier. The special district is viewed as a form of social contract which
enables neighbors on the isolated prairie to unite for the common
good."' The recent proliferation of special districts created to support
activities ranging from tourist promotion to weather control, calls the
accuracy of this earlier view into question. Without provision in en-
abling acts for some judicial scrutiny, the use of tax district funds to
engage in promotional advertising and to finance business enterprises
will merely become a means of permanently placing tax burdens upon
large stretches of land regardless of any benefits accruing to future
residents. Collective bargaining agreements with taxing districts might
also be thought to raise problems," 9 though the issues in this area are
So. 313 (1938) (rights of citizens outside district to convenient schools must be found
not impaired).
"17But cf. In re Arch Hurley Conservancy Dist., 52 N.M. 34, 191 P.2d 338 (1948)
(court must find that all of district will benefit). Concern for the welfare of future
citizens was advanced as a ground for judicial intervention some time ago in Reich,
The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 381 (1962). For a discussion of
the use of the generations-yet-to-come argument in traditional and current environmental
thought, see Meyers, An Introduction to Enzironmental Thought: Some Sources and
Some Criticisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 450 (1975).
Is The classic approach is that of Cooley:
[A]s the burdens of municipal government must rest upon [the corporators']
shoulders, and especially as by becoming incorporated they are held, in law, to
undertake to discharge the duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper
that their voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation.
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL. LImrTATIONS 129 [*118] (3d ed. 1874); id. at 236 (8th ed.
1927) (citing cases).
1 9 See K. HANSLOWE, TE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EM-
PLOYMENT 21-24 (1967). Certain courts have held that it would be an impermissible
delegation of legislative power to allow teachers to bargain collectively with school
boards. Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962) ; accord, Rockey v.
School Dist. #11, 32 Colo. App. 203, 508 P.2d 796 (1973). See Board of Educ. v. Scotts-
dale Educ. Ass'n, 17 Ariz. App. 504, 498 P.2d 578 (1972) (rev'g trial ct.), trial ct. re-
versal sustained on other grounds, 109 Ariz. 342, 509 P.2d 612 (1973); Schryver v.
Schirmer, 84 S.D. 352, 171 N.W.2d 634 (1969); Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp.
Rel. Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967) (dictum); Annot, 31 A.L.R.2d 1142,
1170 (1953) and cases therein cited.
The issue of delegation in collective bargaining can sometimes be profitably con-
sidered as a matter of subdelegation-that is, whether the state had delegated to the
[Vol. 50:650
DELEGATION TO PRIVATE PARTIES
not different from those which arise in the law of municipal corpora-
tions generally. And controls over the capacity of ta:payers to prejudice
other residents or bondholders also seem indicatedY But again it may
be doubted that the nondelegation doctrine is the appropriate means
through which to impose controls. Indeed, judicial checks would seem
inappropriate for many of the same reasons that judicial checks on
government expenditures and monetary policy are inappropriate. The
burden of dispensations in favor of special districts falls, at least in the
first instance, on the public at large.
C. Restrictions on the Use of Property
The confusion of thought prevalent in this area of the law is
nowhere more apparent than in the cases relating to the imposition and
removal of zoning restrictions. The history is a familiar one. The
three leading Supreme Court cases have generated much subsequent
confusion. In Eubank v. City of Richmond, 2' decided in 1912, the
Court invalidated a statute allowing two-thirds of the residents of a
street to require revisions in a building line. Five years later, in Thomas
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,'22 the Court upheld a statute requiring
written consent from the owners of the greater part of the frontage on
school board or municipality the powers it was seeking to subdelegate (by bargaining).
Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-1(d) (Code ed. 1975). In most states, school boards
exercise only those powers specifically delegated to them by the state legislature; see, e.g.,
Gary Teachers Union, Local 4, AFT v. School City, 152 Ind. App. 591, 284 N.E.2d
108 (1972). Subdelegation problems always involve initial questions of whether the sub-
delegating body possessed the powers it sought to delegate away. This inquiry is a mat-
ter of statutory construction, as it must be where municipal p)wers arise solely from
statute, and the charge is that the city acted ultra vires. Ultra vires resolution, being
statutory, is preferable to resolution by recourse to the delegat on doctrine, which is a
constitutional argument. For cases applying (and attempting to distinguish) both ultra
vires and delegation doctrines, see City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal.
3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975) ; Jefferson Elementary School Dist. v.
Bent, 41 Cal. App. 3d 962, 116 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1974).
Similar delegation problems arise where municipalities or school boards agree to
settle impasses in bargaining by arbitration (interest arbitration). Comment, Collective
Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68
MIcH. L. Rav. 260, 281-88 (1969). Cf. Gary Teachers Union, Local 4, AFT v. School
City, 152 Ind. App. 591, 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972) (grievance arbitration). The manda-
tory interest arbitration provisions of Maine's teacher bargaining law survived attack
against a charge of unconstitutional delegation, lacking enforceable standards, where it
was argued that legislative policymaking would be delegated to the arbitrators required
to be used in the event of impasse. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304
A.2d 287 (le. 1973) (evenly divided court) (citing and discmwsing delegation cases in
the field of public employment labor relations), construed in Finks v. State Highway
Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791, 795 n.2 (Me. 1974).
12 0 Jaffe at 226 and cases there cited. Cf. Application of Johnston, 69 Idaho 139,
204 P.2d 434 (1949).
121226 U.S. 137 (1912). Cf. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
122 242 U.S. 526 (1917), discussed in text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a street as a prerequisite to the erection of billboards. The Court dis-
tinguished between the imposition and the lifting of restrictions:
The plaintiff in error cannot be injured, but obviously may be
benefited by this provision, for without it the prohibition of the
erection of such billboards in such residence sections is absolute.
He who is not injured by the operation of a law or ordinance
cannot be said to be deprived by it of either constitutional right
or of propertyls2a
Finally, in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,.23
the Court struck down an act requiring consent of two-thirds of the
owners of neighboring property to authorize the construction of an
old people's home. The Court distinguished the Cusack case on the
basis that the billboards were recognized as a nuisance whereas the old
age home was not.
It is easy to scoff at the Supreme Court's distinctions, and many
commentators have indulged in this obvious pleasure. 4 It has been
said of Eubank and Cusack, "[i]n either case, the action or non-action
of the property owners would be the chief factor in determining whether
or not a building line should be established. . . . [The difference] is
a matter of mathematics rather than of legal principle. '""s Commentators
have had an easier time in squaring Roberge and Cusack: since Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.12 used a nuisance criterion to measure
the validity of zoning ordinances, the provision in Roberge may have
been invalid because it undertook to prohibit nonnuisances, not because
it allowed exemptions to the prohibition by the consent of neighbors.
Yet the vindication in Cusack of a statute allowing neighbors to con-
sent to nuisances may still seem a paradox:
Shall the owner of an isolated apartment house be permitted to
erect and maintain a fire-trap with the consent of his tenants?
Shall a grocer be allowed to sell deletrious foods with the consent
122a Id. at 530.
123278 U.S. 116 (1928), discussed in text at note 53 supra.
124 E.g., Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Plan-
ning and Zoning, 24 ILL. L. REv. 135, 142-44 (1929) ; Havighurst, Property Owners' Con-
sent Provisions in Zoning Ordinances, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 175 (1930); McBain, Law-Making
by Property Owners, 36 PoL. Sci. Q. 617 (1921) ; Jaffe at 226-28.
125 McBain, supra note 124, at 637 n.4. Of course, there may be differences in the
amount of social conflict generated by the two types of provisions. It might also be
argued that a purchaser of land subject to a consent statute takes subject to the restric-
tion, but since the market may discount in advance the imposition or removal of a re-
striction there is little difference between the Eubank and Cusack statutes in this respect.
126 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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of his customers? . . . Merely to ask such questicns is to answer
them.127
The vindication of consent statutes may be due to the judicial in-
dulgence toward the dispensing power manifest in other contexts. 2 '
It may seem justified, too, to those who take the view that "it is difficult
to imagine a more appropriate use of the police power, than that which
imposes a limitation upon the use of property for the protection of
community property values."1 2 The courts have not purported to
sustain zoning statutes on this basis,30 though perhaps they should
have done so. If this view of the zoning function is taken, the Eubank-
Cusack distinction can be rationalized:
In the Eubank Case there seems to have been more of an attempt
to invest property owners with powers similar to those of an
administrative board. In the cases where the question is strictly
one of consent of property owners expressed by action, it is
clearer that they are merely permitted to waive a statutory
right passed chiefly for their protection.' 31
But one need not go on with attempts at distinctions. For the
purposes of this analysis, these statutes are all of a piece. Many state
courts, despite Cusack, have invalidated consent statutes even where
possible nuisances are not involved. 3 2 Their hostility-and the hostility
of the Supreme Court to delegation in Eubank and perhaps that in
Roberge-rests on considerations foreign to distinctions between pro-
hibitory and consent statutes, or between nuisances and innocent uses.
The hostility rests rather on a dislike of delegation of powers of an
essentially judicial character. Since zoning statutes, unlike statutes
of the type sustained in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., '3 are thought to
rest on the police power rather than on "the community's understand-
ing of the reciprocal rights and duties of neighboring landowners,"''
delegation of their detailed administration to private groups raises
127 McBain, supra note 124, at 637.
228 Compare the law relating to government gratuities summarized in 4 K. DAVIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 28 (1958).
1.9 McBain, supra note 124, at 639.
130 In the Euclid case, 272 U.S. at 387-88, the Court observed: "The ordinance . . .
must find [its] justification in some aspect of the police power . . .. [Tihe law of
nuisances . . . may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful
aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, the power."
13, Havighurst, supra note 124, at 181.
12'The cases in this area are collected in A. RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING ch. 29 (3d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1974).
133260 U.S. 22 (1922) (sustaining a statute immunizing a person reconstructing a
party wall from liability to his neighbor for incidental damages).
134 2 P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE, & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1336-37 (2d ed. 1961).
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problems akin to those presented by private licensing schemes. Laws
which so literally make persons go as supplicants to their neighbors
may thus seem especially unattractive to the courts.
Hence, many courts and writers have been concerned with the
evil of purchased consents.'35
You cannot with yard stick decide whether the location of [a]
saloon would be an injury. It may or may not be an injury ....
But if you give power to every person within twenty-five feet of
every proposed liquor store to determine that question for him-
self, you put into his hands a great power which he is likely
to abuse .... To give a neighboring real estate owner an uncon-
trollable right to object may . . . be given him the whip hand
over the applicant for a license; and it will depend entirely upon
the character of him who holds that whip, whether this instru-
ment of castigation be used for the owner's protection or be
applied in securing unjust booty. The existing law was put on
the statute book with no view of limiting in number the licenses
granted, or of enhancing the value of one man's real estate at
the expense of another. It was put there as a shield for property
owners against what might be an injury to them. . . . [I]t
was not designed to be used as a sword. But when you give the
absolute right to object, you have put into the hands of men an
irresistible weapon. 36
Thus it can be suggested that the validity of zoning consent statutes
ought to turn on the extent to which the statutes encourage the twin
evils of ad hominem determinations and purchased consents. Where
a statute permits landowners over a reasonably wide area to legitimize
otherwise forbidden uses, the determination made, if not limited to
135 Doane v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 160 Ill. 22, 45 N.E. 507 (1895), is a leading early
case invalidating purchased consents. Of course, a purchased consent may be regarded
as a private substitute for compensation in eminent domain, but the cost of the consent
will be more related to benefit than damage and the prospects for inequities as between
neighbors will be much greater. Similar problems arise under private leases requiring
landlord consent to alterations. In Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927), the Supreme
Court sustained a statute requiring new houses to conform to the setback lines estab-
lished by houses on the same street at the time of the enactment of the statute. Compare
Sierra Constr. Co. v. Board of Appeals, 12 N.Y.2d 79, 187 N.E.2d 123, 236 N.Y.S.2d 53
(1962), where the court, in a 4-3 decision, sustained an ordinance requiring setback
lines of new houses to conform to those established by houses on the same street which
were themselves built after enactment of the ordinance. The decision seems correct;
the houses were not built for the purpose of regulating the conduct of the later builder,
nor are there possibilities of ad hominern determinations and purchased consents under
such an ordinance.
136 Argument of Louis D. Brandeis, on behalf of the Massachusetts Protective
Liquor Dealers' Ass'n, before the Joint Comm. on Liquor Law of the Massachusetts
Legislature, Feb. 27, 1891, reprinted in 1 Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Bran-
deis Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 1057, 1065 (1916).
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a specific case, is legislative rather than essentially judicial in char-
acter. Validation of such statutes is not inconsistent with the thesis
tendered here, even though the area of the referendum may not en-
compass whole townships so as to come under the rule of the local
option cases. But the ordinary ordinance requiring consent of neigh-
bors would properly seem to be more vulnerable to challenge, unless
the view of the Rosenbaum case is taken.
Other courts have followed no consistent patterns in upholding
or invalidating consent provisions. Statutes have been invalidated where
consent was required to operate schools, 13 7 gin mills, 8' and filling
stations,' but validated where commercial enterprises,' 0 used auto
lots,"' liquor licensees,'4 2 taxi stands," 3 and, more recently, "adult"
theatres"" were made subject to the requirement. A statute limiting
a zoning board's discretionary power to grant zoning variances to
cases where variances were requested by two-thirds of the residents
of a district was invalidated," 5 a surprising result in light of Cusack
since the petition did not bind the zoning board and was hence equi-
valent to only a consent provision. Another court upheld a statute
providing that zoning variances required a three-fourths instead of
majority vote by a board vested with discretionary powers when a
protest petition signed by 20 percent of area residents was filed against
a zoning change.146 This result seems consistent with Cusack, since this
is only an elaborate consent provision.
The courts have not even been consistent in cases involving peti-
tions rather than consent provisions, despite the Eubank case. A North
Carolina court upheld a statute giving the owners of property at an
intersection the power (but not the duty) to compel rezoning of their
137 Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 411, 87 A.2d 454 (Ch. Div.
1952), rev'd in part, 11 N.J. 341, 94 A.2d 482 (1953).
138 Wilcher v. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 308, 72 S.E.2d 662 (1952).
139 Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1942). Cf. Niggel v.
City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 19, 173 S.E.2d 136 (1970).
140 Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 16 F. Supp. 101 (D. Minn. 1936); O'Brien v.
City of St. Paul, 285 Minn. 378, 173 N.W.2d 462 (1969).
141 People v. Gottlieb, 337 Mich. 276, 59 N.W.2d 289 (1953).
142 Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279 Ky. 468, 131 S.W.2d 446 (1939).
143 In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24 (1958) (abutting property).
1"' Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 368-69 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(citing Cusack).
1"5 State ex rel. Foster v. City of Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273 (1959).
Cf. O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 285 Minn. 378, 173 N.W.2d 462 (1969) (sustaining a
consent ordinance). A result similar to the result in the Fostir case was reached in
Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608 (Del. 1968).
146 Herrington v. County of Peoria, 11 Ill. App. 3d 7, 295 N.E.2d 731 (1973).
See also Farmer v. Meeker, 63 N.J. Super. 56, 163 A.2d 729 (L. Div. 1956).
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
property when the municipality rezones two other corners at the same
intersection.'47 The court took the view that the statute was valid since
it merely prescribed the conditions under which the zoning power was
to be exercised. By contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated
a statute making changes in street names mandatory when petitioned
for by 60 percent of the residents af a street. "' This case would seem
to be de minimis even under the Eubank rule. It is doubtful whether
the interest of dissenting property owners in the present street name
can supply the basis of a constitutionally noticeable deprivation of right.
D. Determination of Professional and Industrial Standards
The frequent legislative adoption of privately sponsored profes-
sional and industrial standards represents another area in which the
courts have had occasion to invoke the nondelegation doctrine.
1. Statutes Adopting Pre-existing Lists and Codes
The adoption of privately formulated lists and codes has not
troubled the courts when the legislative act adopts a private code in the
form in which it stood at the time that the legislation was passed. This
result is clearly sound. The Noerr and Pennington decisions 4 0 serve
to remind us that freedom for private groups to seek their legislative
ends is itself constitutionaly protected. The fact that a legislature
adopts, by name, a private code rather than enacting a detailed bill
drawn up by the same interest group is scarcely of constitutional signifi-
cance. And the acceptance of a rule which would not distinguish be-
tween the legislative effusions of a small parochial interest group and a
private organization like the American Law Institute would seem
dearly untenable. Though courts have occasionally been troubled by
such legislation by reference, the public filing of the code coupled with
the principle that "that is certain which can be made certain" has usually
proved sufficient to allay their misgivings.
17 Marren v. Gamble, 237 N.C. 680, 75 S.E.2d 880 (1953). Cf. Zopfi v. City of Wil-
mington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
148 People ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 315, 109 N.E.2d
201 (1952).
49 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See Costilo, The Scope of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, 34 ANTrXRusT L.J. 141 (1967). It is not without significance that
the Noerr doctrine has been held partly inapplicable in the context of judicial as distinct
from legislative action. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972).
One court has recently intimated the unconstitutionality of such a statute. Costanzo
v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 126 N.J. Super. 187, 313 A.2d 618 (App. Div. 1974).
[Vol. 50:650
DELEGATION TO PRIVATE PARTIES
2. Educational Accreditation Statutes
The adoption of future standards promulgated by private groups
has understandably given the courts greater difficulty. One major battle-
ground has involved the adoption of classifications of professional
schools issued by medical and bar associations. Graduation from a
privately accredited school has frequently been made a prerequisite to
the obtaining of a license to practice. The early appeal of this legisla-
tion derived from the view that professional men. themselves were
better qualified to gauge the quality of professional education than any
legislative committee or administrative board could be. Thus it is
not surprising that a Kansas court, writing shortly after the beginning
of the reform movement in medical education initiated by the Flexner
Report,' strongly upheld a statute requiring graduation from a
medical school on the "A" or "B" list issued by the American Medical
Association,
the membership of which and the purpose of which are not dis-
dosed, but which we may presume to consist of eminent men in the
medical profession who are prompted by a laudable desire to
elevate the standard of their profession and the standard of
medical schools.""
The more restrictive practices adopted by professional accrediting
agencies... coincided with a more skeptical attitude on the part of the
courts toward the legislative adoption of their private lists. Though a
Florida court upheld a statute requiring veterinarians to be graduates
of approved schools, the opinion did not squarely meet the delegation
question, declaring only that the statute was "reasonable under the
police power.' 1 3 The same court, in two prior cases, had upheld similar
statutes by construing the word "accredited" to mean that the school in
question was accredited at the time the legislation was enacted,""'
following the example of a Rhode Island court. 5' But the Florida
150A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1910).
151Jones v. Kansas State Bd. of Medical Regis. & Educ., Ill Kan. 813, 814, 208
P. 639 (1922) ; accord, Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 77 P. 166 (1904). See also Hewitt
v. Charier, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 353 (1835), typical of the 19th century cases.
152See Jaffe at 230; cf. Quiin, Physician Licensing and Ediecationol Obsolescence:
A Medical-Legal Dilemma, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 503, 505-07 (1972).
253 State ex rel. Kaplan v. Dee, 77 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1955).
15 Attwood v. State ex rel. Newman, 53 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1951); Spencer v. Hunt,
109 Fla. 248, 147 So. 282 (1933).
15 Allen v. State Bd. of Veterinarians, 72 R.I. 372, 52 A.2d 131 (1947). Cf. State
v. Hynds, 61 Ariz. 281, 148 P.2d 1000 (1944), where the court upheld a statute requir-
ing graduation from an approved school of chiropody, without construing the statute,
noting only that it did not delegate power to an association.
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court took a more indulgent view of an adoption of a bar asociation
list. There the word "accredited" was construed to mean that the
school in question was currently approved by the association, 5 ' members
of the bar apparently being considered above suspicion.
The newer attitude toward professional association lists is prob-
ably most accurately reflected in a more recent District of Columbia
Circuit decision'57 subjecting decisions of accrediting agencies to re-
view under the due process clause. The decision may, despite the
deferential standard applied by the court, portend a new attitude.
The lack of administrative or economic checks on the capacity of
professional associations to restrict members and the importance of the
right to practice to those excluded from a profession has understand-
ably tempted the courts to use the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate
statutes requiring graduation from approved schools. Yet the use of
the doctrine in this context raises problems under our analysis-
problems similar to those raised by Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath.5 " The power to designate approved schools may be
thought to operate as a rulemaking rather than a licensing power when
individual doctors themselves make complaint about the statute, since
it is, in form, a licensing power only in relation to the schools them-
selves. The view here taken stresses the correctives which operate
upon abuses of rulemaking powers; abuses of rulemaking powers are
more visible, fall on and thus give rise to reaction by the community
at large, and may more readily be redressed after the event. Licensing
powers, by contrast, bear more heavily on particular individuals, while
150Ex parte State Bd. of Law Examiners, 141 Fla. 706, 193 So. 753 (1940).
157 Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). In People v.
Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 337, 503 P.2d 257, 269, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1972), there are
dicta to the effect that "reliance upon the standards of professional accrediting bodies is
not an unconstitutional delegation of governmental power if it isneither arbitrary, un-
reasonable, nor discriminatory." Cf. Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J.L. &
EcoN. 20, 27-29 (1958). Statutes which merely provide for education in a school main-
taining standards equal to those prevailing in approved schools do not disturb the courts.
See State ex rel. Beck v. Gleason, 148 Kan. 1, 79 P.2d 911 (1938). For an earlier view,
see E. FREUND, ADmINIsTRATvE PowERs ovER PRsoN s AND PioPErTv 47 (1928):
In attempting to secure desirable standards, the legislature may deem it advis-
able not to establish such standards directly by law or even by administrative
regulation, but to rely upon parties to put their own house in order ...
[A] form of such utilization is the official employment of organizations
having a recognized monopoly of representation of interests. This type is found
in the regulation of professions. It was formerly common, but is somewhat
inconsistent with modem principles of public law. New York dropped the sys-
tem in 1910, but it still survives to some extent in England (Royal College of
Veterinary Surgeons).
158 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) ; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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abuses of them are less likely to be brought to public view or be suscep-
tible of easy correction. It is clear under this view that the schools have
reason to complain of the delegation, and it may be thought reasonable
to allow their graduates to complain on their behalf where the accredit-
ing system was not in operation at the time of the applicant's enrollment.
Where it was in operation when the applicant enrolled, more difficult
problems are presented. The widespread use of a statutory requirement
of graduation from an "accredited" college or university suggests that
it would be highly awkward to adopt a blanket rule of invalidity. Thus
it is by no means clear that delegations to professional groups of power
to generate standards (number of books, of instructors, etc.) which
schools must meet to be licensed ought to be considered invalid per se
merely because they may be restrictive. Where the standards are
arbitrary the delegation, at least in its exercise, may fail on equal pro-
tection grounds; had the celebrated pre-World War II refusal to charter
foreign medical schools been implemented by rule it might still have
been vulnerable in this respect.159
3. Health and Safety Standards
The several cases invalidating the incorporation into building codes
of future electrical wiring standards formulated by associations of
insurance underwriters' do not raise the analytical problems suggested
by the medical accreditation cases. The wiring cases seem incorrect
under our analysis, since they involve mere rulemaking powers. The
fact that the economic interests of insurance companies may point to the
maintenance of unworkably high safety standards does not justify in-
validation on delegation grounds. And though privately enforced
standards have been met with suspicion in antitrust cases where formu-
lated in part by competitors of persons against whom they are en-
forced,18" ' it may be suggested under our analysis that this sort of bias in
219 See Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private
Groups, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1398 (1954). The accreditation of hospitals by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals raises similar delegation problems. Worthington
& Silver, Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The Need for Change, 35 LAw &
CONTEMiP. PROB. 305, 320 n.68 (1970).
11o Such statutes were invalidated in City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P.2d
72 (1935) (here the approved methods were made only prima faci, evidence) ; Agnew v.
City of Culver City, 147 Cal. App. 2d 144, 304 P.2d 788 (1956) ; State v. Crawford, 104
Kan. 141, 177 P. 360 (1919); Hillman v. Northern Wasco County People's Util. Dist,
213 Ore. 264, 323 P.2d 664 (1958). However, a more recent case upheld a similar statute
against attack on delegation grounds, finding no actual delegation. Kingery v. Chapple,
504 P.2d 831, 836-37 n.13 (Alaska 1972).
161 Cf. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658
(1961), where a boycott by public utilities of persons using gas turners failing to con-
form to American Gas Association standards was held a per se violation of the Sherman
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rulemaking (apart from equal protection problems its results may raise)
ought not to raise delegation problems when the rules are regularly en-
forced through the courts. Enforcement of privately formulated
standards by private boycott involves a licensing as well as a rulemaking
function not present where the rules are enforced at law. Though the
Sherman Act boycott cases clearly rest on antipathy toward "private
government"'62 and not on economic effects alone, their lessons are not
clearly applicable to delegation cases involving rulemaking functions
only.
Judicial suspicion of electrical wiring codes has not extended to
Act. The Association consisted of utilities, manufacturers of gas burners, and pipeline
companies. In a suit brought against the Association by a manufacturer of unapproved
burners, the Court observed that the association's "tests are not based on 'objective
standards,' but are influenced by respondents, some of whom are in competition with
petitioner, and thus its determinations can be made 'arbitrarily and capriciously.'" It
is not clear that the result in this case rests on the participation of competitors in the
association. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals
to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247; Comment, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups:
Illegality Under the Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 171 (1962). Cf. Roofire Alarm
Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963), holding that a primary boycott by a testing as-
sociation, none of whose members were in competition with the plaintiff, was not action-
able under the Sherman Act.
162The antipathy toward "private government" is reflected in many Sherman Act
cases hnd, of course, plays a prominent role in that Act's folklore. See, e.g., T. AplNOLD,
THE BOrLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940). In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899), it was said that the condemned violation "trenches upon the
power of the national legislature and violates the statute." In Fashion Originators' Guild
of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941), it was said that "the combination is in
reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and re-
straint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination
and punishment of violations .... ." See also Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 19 (1945). But cf. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936):
"Voluntary action to end abuses and to foster fair competitive opportunities in the public
interest may be more effective than legal processes. And cooperative endeavor may ap-
propriately have wider objectives than merely the removal of evils which are infractions
of positive law." Cf. also the curious decision in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (holding that the availability to a private group of a statutory exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws was dependent upon the extent of the hearing the private
group accorded to nonmembers), construed in Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 95 S.
Ct. 2598 (1975).
It is significant that the references to "private government" rarely occur in the con-
text of simple price-fixing, where the price-fixing is unaccompanied by elements of boy-
cott. It has been suggested that there are even limitations on the per se illegality of
boycotts, some commentators finding these in noncommercial purpose. See Coons, Non-
Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. Rv. 705 (1962) ; Cf.
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959). Others hold that
the per se prohibition extends only to secondary, as opposed to primary, boycotts.
See Comment, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality Under the
Sherman Act, 30 U. ClI. L. REV. 171 (1962). For a classic attack on boycotts as a form
of private government, see Stephen, On the Suppression of Boycotting, 20 THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 765 (1886). See generally Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the
Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 506 (1974).
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legislative adoption of the pharmacopoeia compiled by the United States
Pharmacopoeial Convention,"13 an organization composed of federal
agencies, national medical and pharmaceutical associations and schools
of medicine and pharmacy.'
4. Prevailing Wage Laws
In the cases involving so-called "prevailing wage" statutes a number
of judges have likewise taken an indulgent view. Courts have had little
difficulty in rejecting contentions that statutes directing administrative
commissions to determine and pay prevailing local wages to state em-
ployees constitute an unconstitutional delegation to the commissions.' 65
Where statutes provide for the payment of prevailing union wage rates,
courts have been sharply split. In 1922, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
divided 4 to 3 in invalidating a statute which would have required a
city council to pay wages equal to those "paid to members of any
regular and recognized organization of. . . skilled laborers .
The court read the statute as imposing a purely ministerial duty on the
council to accept any union wage scale.
In 1953, the Illinois Supreme Court, without discussion, invalidated
a similar "union wage" statute. 6 ' A Kentucky court, four years before,
however, upheld a statute requiring the payment of the prevailing rates
as set in union collective bargaining contracts "if there are such agree-
ments . . . in the locality applying to a sufficient number of employes
to furnish a reasonable basis for considering those rates to be the pre-
vailing rates in the locality."' 68 The fact that the delegated power was
subject to market control thus legitimized the statute. The rationali-
zation that such statutes are valid because the private actions were
legislatively noticed "facts" may not be fictitious in "prevailing wage"
cases. More recently, a South Dakota court struck down a similar
statute directed at Sioux Falls firemen, finding, as did the Wisconsin
113 Such statutes were upheld in the cases of White v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 285
App. Div. 486, 138 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1955); and State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d
364 (1953). For a similar view, see Osco Drug, Inc. v. Pharmacy Exam. Bd., 61 Wis.
2d 689, 695, 214 N.V.2d 47, 50 (1974) (Hansen, J., dissenting).
164 For a description of the organization, see Note, Slate Regitlation of Drugs: Who
May Sell "Patent and Proprietary" Medicines, 63 YALE L.J. 550, 152 n.10 (1954).
10 See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 944, 965-69 (1968) and cases there cited.
Criminal statutes of this type can raise void-for-vagueness problems. See Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The federal Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §
276a (1970), and Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970), embody similar standards.
106 Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 410, 411, 188 N. W. 487 (1922).
1637 Bradley v. Casey, 415 Ill. 576, 114 N.E.2d 681 (1953).
168 Baughn v. Gorrell & Riley, 311 Ky. 537, 540, 224 S.W.2d 436, 438 (1949) (quot-
ing the statute).
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court in 1922, that "neither the city commission nor any agency thereof
retains any power or discretion to ascertain or determine what are pre-
vailing wages . . . . The trade unions and private contractors .
absolutely fix the same."' 9 On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found no difficulty in sustaining that state's prevailing wage
statuteY.
70
5. Union and Company Rules
The recognition by unemployment insurance appeal boards of
union rules limiting allowable periods of employment of members as
good cause for relinquishing employment has troubled some courts.
An Ohio court invalidated such a course of action, 17 while a New
York court upheld it only after noting that the board had discretion to
reject unreasonable rules. 2 Judicial hostility to the use of such rules
probably derives from doubts as to their wisdom as a matter of public
policy rather than from views as to procedural unfairness. For here
again, the delegation, if any, would seem to involve the power to make
rules rather than the power to adjudicate rights. Where the effect of
the use of a rule is to significantly increase a former employer's insur-
ance premiums (as opposed to state contributions), he may, however, be
thought under this formula to possess an interest which the delega-
tion doctrine should protect, if the union rule in question applies to his
employees alone and not to members of the union employed elsewhere.
However, it may be significant in this connection that "company rule"
tort doctrines have little troubled the courts, though rules of such
limited scope may be thought in effect to amount to adjudications of the
rights of those subject to them. Their validity may be saved by the
fact that they appear in a contractual setting. Since the existence of
the employment relationship is voluntary on both sides, both union
rules and company rules may be thought not to raise delegation prob-
109 Schryver v. Schirmer, 84 S.D. 352, 358-59, 171 N.W.2d 634, 638 (1969). A pos-
sible distinction from prior cases was articulated by the court: "We see very little or no
similarity between the character of the work performed by city firemen and that of the
. . .tradesmen designated in the ordinance." Id. at 637. A statute which set a wage
rate for municipal employees based on that in a neighboring municipality was upheld in
Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1968).
170 Male v. Ernest Renda Contracting Co., 64 N.J. 199, 314 A.2d 361 (1974).
17, Chambers v. Ohio Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 15 Ohio Supp. 106, 30 Ohio Op. 1
(C.P. 1944), reVd sub nom. Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs.
146, 62 N.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1945), rev'd, 146 Ohio St. 559, 33 Ohio Op. 60, 67 N.E.2d
439 (1946).
172 In re Fiol, 279 App. Div. 963, 111 N.Y.S.2d 288, appeal denied, 280 App. Div. 901,
115 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1952), remanded, 305 N.Y. 264, 112 N.E.2d 281 (1953), on remand,
.284 App. Div. 519, 132 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1954), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 661, 128 N.E.2d 317 (1955).
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lems, since those subject to them can readily remove themselves from
their scope.
173
E. Resale Price Maintenance
The doctrine forbidding delegations to private parties has achieved
its greatest importance in recent years in connection with state court
decisions invalidating the so-called "nonsigner" clauses of state resale
price maintenance statutes. The high courts of 16 states, including the
important commercial states of California, Illinois, New Jersey, and
New York, have upheld the statutes. The highest courts of 25
states, including those of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina
and Michigan, have invalidated the statutes.17 4  In addition, "new
type" statutes proceeding on an implied contract thEory making receipt
of goods prima facie evidence of agreement to adhere to price condi-
tions have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Virginia 7  and by
a controlling minority of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 76 while a statute
providing for resale price maintenance by notice attached to the goods
was upheld in New Jersey in an early case.
7 7
Many of the state court decisions invalidating price maintenance
statutes have rested in whole or in part on nondelegation grounds. 78
A number of courts have also declared that all delegations to private
parties are forbidden, regardless of standards or safeguards which
may be present,'17  one court distinguishing between delegations to
private and public bodies in this respect. 8 Other courts, adopting a
restrictive view of legislative power, take the position that the legisla-
ture may not forbid one who has acquired a comriwodity to determine
its resale price, absent a substantial "public intere t."'' Still others,
173 As to conformity with "company rules" as evidence of due care in negligence
actions, see C. GREGORY & H. KALvEN, CASES AND MATERIALS 01: TORTS 143-45 (2d ed.
1969). See also Jaffe at 113-49. On the reach of corporate bylaw's, see A. DICEY, INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 71-77 (10th ed. 1960) ; 3 R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 652-54 (1959).
174 The cases are collected in 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 6021. The most recent example
is Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 3.E.2d 141 (1974).
'75 Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 4 (1961).
170 Hudson Distribs. v. Upjohn Corp., 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N.E.2d 460 (1963),
aff'd, 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
177 Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 222, 101 A. 1030 (Ch. Ct. 1917).
178 E.g., Coming Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.3.2d 354 (Mass. 1973);
Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
17 E.g., Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 InJ. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415
(1957). But see Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Wheeling Frenchman, 235 La. 332,
103 So. 2d 464 (1958).
180 General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
181 This may well be the modem view. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs.,
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despite requirements of "free and open competition" in the acts, invali-
dated the statutes for want of standards. 18 2 Some pointed to the lack
of safeguards such as hearing and judicial review.113 At least one court
invalidated an act on the basis that by creating an antitrust exemption,
the act would allow private parties to repeal a law; but the court would
presumably have been satisfied with the act if no antitrust prohibi-
tion existed. 4 Finally, a number of courts, engaging in formal dis-
tinctions between delegation of power to make law and delegation of
power to apply it, have condemned the acts on the curious ground that
no duty exists to set a resale price." 5 To these courts, mandatory price
maintenance, such as that provided in the liquor trade in some states,
stands on a better footing than purely permissive legislation, despite
the fact that the available economic checks are less significant.
The courts that have upheld the acts against challenge on delegation
grounds have utilized varied reasoning. Some, following the federal
Old Dearborn case, 8 ' take the view that the acts merely protect the
continuing property of a manufacturer in his trademark. Others take
the view that the actions of private parties authorized by the statutes
do not involve the exercise of legislative power at all, since the legis-
lature could not itself constitutionally establish the price of a particular
branded article, as distinct from a commodity.8 7 Similar reasoning ap-
Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
182 E.g., Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
183 E.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961).
'
8 4 McGrav Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 60W.
(1955).
185 E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
186 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). On
the willingness of courts to authorize delegations when linked to familiar categories of
property or contract, see Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to
Private Groups, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1398 (1954). Cases at common law not involving con-
stitutional questions have occasionally authorized what are in effect "delegations," by
analogy to equitable servitudes on land. Cf. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41
HARv. L. Rv. 945 (1928). Of course, even land servitudes may be viewed as "delega-
tions." Perhaps their respectability derives from the fact that they have been traditionally
recognized at common law. That only underlines the fact that the nondelegation doctrine
rests largely on a confusion of the familiar with the necessary. For suggestions that
decisions in this area should turn on the extent to which survival outside the contract is
feasible, see Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations, 43 HlAv. L. REv. 993, 1021-23(1930).
187 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Payless Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P.2d 936
(1955). See Hale, Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties, 39 COLuL,. L. REv. 563, 576
(1939):
[I]t is . . . seldom recognized that when the state is enforcing contract and
property rights at common law it is using its compulsory powers to effectuate the
wills of private persons, and doing so in a manner which forces other private
persons to forego the exercise of liberties which the state could not constitu-
tionally deny them in furtherance of any legislative policy of its own other
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pears to lie behind the decisions upholding newer statutes on the basis
that the acts merely alter private commercial law.' Other courts find
in the "free and open competition" clause an adequate statutory
standard, even though such standards guide only courts and not the
rulemakers where acts of private parties (as opposed to public agencies)
are at issue."' 9 A federal court, in the second Schw,'gmann case, found
adequate safeguards in the operation of market forces.' A number
of early courts upheld the nonsiguer clauses by analogy to Lumley v.
Gye. '9 This analogy on its face is not invalid where a manufacturer
may restrict his distribution to signers of contracts."9' But recent anti-
trust decisions make it doubtful that he may lawfully do so,"' while
some courts have refused to protect price maintenance contracts against
induced breach even where distribution is thus limited.'94 Finally, there
than that of enforcing contracts or protecting property.
Pushed to its extreme, the nondelegation doctrine could be viewed as precluding any
public protection or recognition of private property rights, cf. Cohen, Property and Sov-
ereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), or at least any legislative extension or enforcement
of them that goes beyond the "common law." Cf. Bell v. Mar3land, 378 U.S. 226, 286,
304 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 284 U.S. 641, 657 (1966)
(emphasis added) : "[T]he principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in
laws denying fundamental rights . . . is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by
appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure . ,. ." [ 1] See also San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) ; Macmillan v. Board
of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970).
288 A trial judge upheld the "implied contract" provision of the Virginia act by
analogy to contracts of adhesion in insurance law. See Brief for Appellant at 3-4,
Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 368 U.S. 4 (1961).
181 See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Dichter, 102 N.H. 505, 161 A.2d 569 (1960).
Cf. Vornado, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 255 F. Supp. 216 (D N.J. 1966).
100 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788, 792 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953) :
It was, we think, within the province of the legislature to acsume that economic
laws constitute a sufficient restraint against capricious or arbitrary price fixing
by the producer. As pointed out long ago by Louis D. (later Mr. Justice)
Brandeis, the producer "establishes his price at his peril-the peril that if he sets
it too high, either the consumer will not buy or, if tle artcle is, nevertheless,
popular, the high profits will invite even more competition."
Cf. Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 n.5 (1949).
1912 El. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). See Ma:. Factor & Co. v. Kuns-
man, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d 177, aff'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936). Cf. Bissell Carpet Sweeper
Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957), where t'he nonsigner clause was
upheld insofar as it codified this doctrine.
102 Where distribution was thus restricted, it could be prestmed that any nonsigner
selling goods had induced the breach of a signer's contract. See Sunbeam Corp. v. Pay-
less Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1953). This doctrine, in more highly de-
veloped form, supplies the basis of resale price maintenance in Germany, where actions
against nonsigners are not expressly provided by statute. See Scapiro, The Gernman Law
Against Restraints of Competition-Comparative and International Aspects, 62 COLUm.
L. REv. 1, 201, 207 (1962).
103 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). Cf. Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 946 (5th Cir. 1975).
104 See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
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are, as might be expected, courts which uphold the statutes after hew-
ing to formal distinctions between the delegation of power to make a
law and the delegation of power to apply it.' 5
It is thus apparent that considerable confusion of thought has
accompanied judicial consideration of the delegation problem presented
by these statutes. This confusion has been particularly apparent in con-
nection with efforts to induce federal courts to invalidate state legis-
lation on nondelegation grounds, since, as discussed above, it is not clear
which provision of the federal constitution operates to restrict the
delegation of legislative power by state governments.' Similar obser-
vations can be made as to challenge of federal enabling acts on dele-
gation grounds, since these acts can be questioned only on the dubious
basis that they delegate power to repeal federal statutes, not on the
basis that they empower private parties to legislate in regard to the
conduct of other individuals. 9 7
Most of the cases embodying such arguments do little more than
announce conclusions." 8 The cases upholding the statutes on the basis
But see Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Allied Gas & Chem. Co., 328 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Iowa
1971).
'95E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Weco
Prods. Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937). But cf. Coming
Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Mass. 1973).
'
99 See the concurring opinion of Justices Harlan and Frankfurter in Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 855 (1961) (emphasis in original) :
Moreover, it is by no means clear to me in what part of the Federal Con-
stitution we are to find the prohibition of state-authorized self-regulation of and
by an economic group that the Schechter case found in Article I as respects the
Federal Government. Is state-authorized self-regulation of lawyers to be the
occasion for judicial enforcement of Art. IV, § 4, which provides that "The
United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form
of government . . . ?"
Justice Douglas, dissenting, was able only to observe that "[a] self-policing provision
whereby lawyers were given the power to investigate and disbar their associates would
raise under most, if not all, state constitutions the type of problem posed in [Schechter]."
367 U.S. at 878 n.1 (emphasis added). See generally D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR
(1963).
'9 Cf. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). But see Rail-
way Employees Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), where closed shop contracts
were held to constitute state action since a federal enactment removed barriers to their
validity imposed by state law. Even this rule would not necessarily extend to conduct
legitimized by a federal enactment which removes barriers to validity imposed by federal
law. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 95 S. Ct 2427 (1975).
There might also be a paradox in holding first, that the acts of price-maintaining manu-
facturers are "legislative," so as to run afoul of the delegation doctrine; and second, that
such acts are private acts so as to require special federal antitrust immunity despite the
rule of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance,
State Action, and the Antitrust Laws, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349 (1951). See also Rahl, Con-
trol of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-A Study in Antitrust Analysis, 61 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1 (1966).
198 There is merit in Justice Hughes' remark in Carter that this approach "would
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that the power delegated is one the legislature could not itself directly
exercise are made of more substantial stuff, in the light of suggestions
by some scholars that the inability of a legislature to regulate in detail
may justify greater breadth of delegation.' But this too does not
reach the central question if the nondelegation doctrine is to be viewed
primarily as an aspect of procedural rather than sibstantive due pro-
cess.
20 0
Even if scope is left for a rule against delegation of rulemaking
powers, there is no reason to believe that the statutes should fall, for
the breadth of the delegation at issue is far narrower than that of
those condemned in the Schechter and Carter caseE: each delegate is
accorded power to regulate the prices of a single trademarked article,
not of an industry. Where the market power of a manufacturer is
small, the power can scarcely be considered tantamount to a power to
license or exclude.2 " Delegations to control persons in a chain of title
fall well along the continuum which connects legislation and voluntary
contract: where subjection to a regulation can be avoided at relatively
small cost, it may not be altogether fictitious to consider that failure to
avoid it may amount to implied assent. 2 ' The intimate connection
between enforcement of price maintenance by legal action and enforce-
remove all restrictions upon the delegation of legislative power, as the making of laws
could thus be referred to any designated officials or private p rsons whose orders or
agreements would be treated as 'events,' with the result that they would be invested with
the force of law having penal sanctions." 298 U.S. at 318.
10 Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 561
(1947). Resale price maintenance in the book trade has been defended on this basis.
In re Net Book Agreement, 1 W.L.R. 1347 (R.P.C. 1962) ; In r,? Associated Booksellers
of New Zealand, [1962] N.Z.L.R. 1057 (Trade Prac. App. Auth.). The copyright
monopoly has been similarly defended. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I,
45 COLUMi. L. Rxv. 503, 519 (1945).
200 See Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private
Groups, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1398 (1954).
201 Of course, critics of the legislation frequently contend that the power to impose
price conditions is equivalent to the power to exclude. But courts, paradoxically, have
frequently viewed statutes which require manufacturers to set resale prices with greater
indulgence than statutes which merely permit them to do so. Cf. Allied Properties v. De-
partment of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 150, 346 P.2d 737, 741-42 (1959),
where it was observed:
One of the new features is that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act requires,
rather than permits, producers and wholesalers to set retail prices. This fact,
however, does not render the function of a producer or wholesaler legislative in
character but, to the contrary, decreases his discretion since he is not free to de-
termine whether fair trading should occur. While mandatou fair trading means
that retailers cannot obtain merchandise free from price re-trictions, this is due
to the determination of the Legislature, not the action of the producers and
wholesalers.
See also Schenley Affil. Brands Corp. v. Kirby, 21 Cal. App. 31 177, 98 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1971).
02 This was the view of the Old Dearborn case, 292 'U.S. at 192.
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ment by individual refusal to deal makes the point clearer."' For the
purposes of constitutional law,2"' if not of antitrust law, Justice
Holmes' dissenting observation in the Beech-Nut..2 case may seem
sufficient, at least where the market power of manufacturers is small:
I cannot see how it is unfair . . . to say to those to whom the
respondent sells, and to the world, you can have my goods only
on the terms that I propose, when the existence of any competi-
tion in dealing with them depends on the respondent's will.
This is in accordance with the thesis of this article: that delega-
tions to private parties ordinarily become objectionable only where
they involve the power to adjudicate, not the power to make rules
enforceable by the ordinary processes of law. Of course, the "fair
trade" case differs somewhat from the cases where the institution of
legal actions to enforce privately formulated rules is left to a public
officer.2"" Under most "fair trade" statutes, enforcement is left to
actions brought by private persons, thus perhaps opening up possibilities
of favoritism and selective enforcement not present where enforce-
ment is vested in public officers. But it may be doubted that this fact
enhances the possibilities of arbitrariness in enforcement: where
203 See Levi, infra note 204. Cf. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) ; Bork, A Reply to
Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.. 731 (1967) ; Bork, Resale Price Maintenance
and Conminer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968).
20 It was suggested at an earlier time that individual refusals to deal were them-
selves constitutionally protected. See Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The
Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. Rr.v. 258, 284 n.143, citing Grenada
Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440 (1910) ("That any one of the persons en-
gaged in the retail lumber business might have made a fixed rule of conduct not to buy
his stock from a producer or wholesaler who should sell to consumers in competition
with himself, is plain. No law which would infringe his freedom of contract in that
particular would stand.") The force of that decision is strengthened rather than
weakened by the fact that it involved a secondary as opposed to primary refusal to deal,
and hence countenanced injury to an innocent neutral. That legislation (e.g., open-occu-
pancy and dealer franchise statutes) impairing the right may be valid would seem by
now to be clear. Significantly, the restriction of the use of trespass statutes to enforce
xefusals to deal based on racial distinctions took place against a background of collective
-discrimination, including secondary boycotts. For other authorities suggesting the nar-
Towing scope of the individual right, see, in addition to the antitrust cases discussed in
Parke, Davis, the following authorities: Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307
F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962) (refusal to deal with treble damage suitor held antitrust viola-
tion); Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H. W. Wright & Co., 377 F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1973).
See Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506
(1974). These antitrust decisions are of arguable merit in the light of the fact that sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act purports to reach only contracts, combinations, and conspir-
acies. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
205 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 457 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
206 See Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (indicating the wide discretion
left to the FTC).
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private suits are involved, courts are bound by equitable doctrines to
refuse or lift injunctions where a showing of uniform enforcement is
not made,2°r while public prosecutors are in practice left much greater
discretion in bringing enforcement actions-discretion limited only by
the restraints which Yick Wo v. Hopkins.. imposes on systematic
discrimination, and not by the purely theoretical "duty to prosecute."2 9
The "fair trade" statutes do not confer on any single delegate the
right to deprive another person of the opportunity to pursue a lawful
calling, nor do they authorize price maintenance by monopolists or
agreements between those to whom power is delegated. Attacks on the
statutes for their supposed want of standards or of procedural safeguards
such as public hearings and judicial review seem misconceived. 1
Standards are today required, if at all, only as a means of defining
the subject matter of the power to be exercised by administrators; they
have limited impact on the judgment of either public administrators or
reviewing courts in appraising the proper exercise of delegated powers.
And there is no constitutional requirement of hearing or review or even
of an impartial tribunal when legislation or rulemaking is at issue;211
to decry the lack of such safeguards is again to confuse legislation with
adjudication.1 2 The "fair trade" statutes do not resemble licensing
statutes in either form or substance. The power delegated is a rule-
making power, and the statutes, whatever their economic merits, 13
do little to restrict vocational opportunities but rather have the opposite
purpose and tendency.21 If the statutes are to be condemned, it is fair
207The discretion of trademark proprietors under the fair trade acts is limited by a
number of equitable doctrines which do not restrict public agencies. Where uniform
enforcement is not shown, courts may refuse or dissolve injunctions, or grant them con-
ditionally. In addition, disfavored retailers may sue their competitors under many state
acts.
208 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
200 See, e.g., State v. LeVien, 44 N.J. 323, 209 A.2d 97 (1965).
210 E.g., Conant, Constitutionality of Non-Signer Clauses, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 539
(1961).211 See cases cited in 4 K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 28.19 (1958)
(review); 1 id. § 7.19 (Supp. 1970) (hearing).
212 Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) ; Bell
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1266 (3d Cir. 1974).
213For a vigorous economic defense of the practice, see P. ANDREWS & F. FRMAY,
FAiR TRADE: RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE RF-EXAMINED (1950). Such works, how-
ever, are in a distinct minority. See, e.g., Hudson, Constitutionality of the Florida Fair
Trade Act and Continuing Myths of Resale Price Maintenance, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 641(1972). The issues are ably defined in A. NEALE, THE ANTITRTUST LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES oF AimIcA 336-64 (2d ed. 1970).
214 Cf. the justification of the practice in THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN
VORLD 218 (A. Lief ed. 1941) :
The fixing of the price has possibly prevented one retailer from selling the
article a little lower than the other, but the fixing of that price has tended not to
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to suggest that the condemnation should proceed on the basis of the
doctrines through which those courts which care to do so have tradi-
tionally expressed their notions as to economic policy. The nondelega-
tion doctrine, properly treated, should be preserved to other ends. 15
F. Administration of Law and Representation of Interests
The participation of private interests in the choice of members of
public boards, and the delegation to private associations of authority
to administer regulatory schemes, have been the subject of much discus-
sion by writers on administrative law.21 While most courts and scholars
would agree with Justice Cardozo's statement in Schechter that
"[w]hen the task that is set before one is that of cleaning house, it is
prudent as well as usual to take counsel of the dwellers, 2117 their views
on specific problems exhibit little consistency.
Less than 50 years ago, Ernst Freund could observe that "[n] either
in the United States federal service nor in New York are there bodies
constituted on the principle of interest representation." Freund went
on to make the suggestive comment that:
Altogether, lay co-operation seems to be utilized more in
England than in America. Probably this is due to the higher
development in England of professionalism in the civil service.
Nominally, it is true that ruling powers in England are largely
in the hands of politically constituted officials; but in substance,
decisions are inevitably controlled by the professional staff. It
serves then to temper the odium of adverse rulings and to remove
resulting friction, if a popular element enters into the administra-
tion. This consideration was certainly conspicuous in the creation
of the English tax commissioners. But in America there is no
suppress but to develop competition, because it has made it possible in the dis-
tribution of those goods to go to an expense and to open up another sphere of
merchandising which would have been absolutely impossible without a fixed
price. The whole world can be drawn into the field. Every dealer, every small
stationer, every small druggist, every small hardwareman can be made a pur-
veyor of that article by comprehensive advertising and you have stimulated,
through the fixed price, the little owner as against the department store.
215 Decisions condemning price maintenance statutes contrast strangely with the re-
luctance of many of the same state courts to narrow the range of administrative actions
made unreviewable by statute, and with the willingness of many courts to justify arbi-
trary denial of occupational licenses on the basis that "privileges" rather than "rights"
are involved. See cases cited in 1 K. DAvis, ADMIN IsTRxrIvn LAW TREATISE § 7.19
(Supp. 1970).
210 See, e.g., W. GELLIORN, FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 116-44 (1941).
Delegation problems inherent in student or faculty adjudicatory discipline committees in
state colleges and universities are discussed in Hornby, Delegating Authority to the Com-
munity of Scholars, 1975 DUKE L.J. 279.
217 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 552 (1935) (con-
curring opinion).
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similar contrast between professionalism and nonprofessionalism.
The classified civil service is a relatively recent thing, and not
permanent or a career in the English sense. Officials are not as yet
a class apart. We accept the jury system but are not inclined to
apply a similar idea to the administration. The sporadic instances
of lay service in the administration have shown no vitality.
21s
Three types of arrangement generate most of the delegation cases
in this field. Under some statutes, private groups are empowered to
appoint members of state boards, subject to no requirement of official
approval. Other statutes vest in private associations or occupational
groups a nominating function, or require that members of a public
agency be appointed from members of specified groups. Still other
statutes accord existing private groups authority to govern certain
fields, without formally cloaking them with the mantle of public au-
thority by placing them under oath or providing for their payment.
In considering the way in which courts have dealt with these
arrangements, it is best to classify the cases according to the nature of
powers delegated, rather than according to the type of body to which
they are delegated. It is appropriate to begin with private licensing
and disciplinary schemes, before turning to delegations of rulemaking
powers and delegations of the power to administer public funds and
resources.
1. Delegation of Judicial and Licensing Powers
a. To existing private groups
Courts have demonstrated fairly consistent hostility toward statutes
vesting licensing powers in private groups when these groups are not
clothed in the raiment of a public board and no review is provided. Two
New York cases invalidating statutes vesting licensing powers over
harness race starters and horse trainers in private groups such as the
218 E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE PowERs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 52 (1928). A
few federal bodies had been constituted on the principle of interest representation prior
to Freund's work. See gencrally Chamberlain, Democratic Control of Administration, 13
A.B.A.J. 186 (1927). Note in particular Act of May 28, 1924, ch. 202, § 3, 43 Stat. 177,
178; Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 315, § 2, 43 Stat. 599 (District of Columbia Optometry
Board, Dental Board) ; Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 304, 41 Stat. 456, 470 (Railway La-
bor Board provision of Esch-Cummings Act). The Federal Resnrve Board open-market
committees elected by directors of federal reserve banks pursumt to 12 U.S.C. § 263
(1970) supply one such example. The participation of three members elected by bar
associations in the seven-man judicial nominating commissions under the so-called Mis-
souri Plan provide another less clear example. Delegations to professional bodies, like
delegations to public utilities, are frequently deemed unobjectionable by reason of the
"duty to serve" assumed to limit such bodies in the exercise of the granted powers, or by
reason of the job mobility and consequent greater independence o professionals. See A.
DE GRAZiA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 219 (1951).
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New York Jockey Club are typical here.2"9 In Pennsylvania, a statute
permitting three private organizations to select a near-majority of a
commmittee charged with disbursement of funds collected pursuant
to the Harness Racing Act was held invalid. 20 Cases in other states
have invalidated statutes requiring the unanimous consent of existing
banks in a community as a condition precedent to the licensing of new
banks.22' A New Jersey court invalidated a statute delegating to the
State Medical Society power to approve or veto group medical-surgical
plans. The court stressed the fact that "the Medical Society . . . has
an interest in promoting the welfare of the only existing medical service
corporation [Blue Shield] in this State." '222 An accompanying statute
denying licenses to medical service corporations in any county in which
51 percent of the practicing physicians were not participating physicians
was also invalidated by a divided court.221
A number of "automobile anti-bootlegging" statutes generated
similar judicial hostility. The statutes limit the sale of new cars to
dealers franchised by automobile manufacturers, and were enacted at the
behest of dealers who feared the competition of "discount houses"
selling cars surreptitiously obtained from overstocked franchises. 2' In
invalidating such a statute on delegation grounds, a divided Ohio court
described it as an unlawful delegation, arguing that "the case at bar
is even more emphatic because private automobile manufacturers from
out of the state are vested with power to determine who shall sell new
cars in this state."22 ' A number of other courts have struck down the
statutes on equal protection grounds. 226 However, a Louisiana court
219 Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 97 N.E.2d 873 (1951) ; Murtha v. Monaghan, 7 Misc.
2d 568, 169 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nere., 5 App. Div. 2d 695, 169 N.Y.S.2d 1010
(1957), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 897, 151 N.E.2d 83 (1959).22o Hetherington v. McHale, 329 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1974).
221Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949). See also Mon-
tana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Johanneson, 153,N.W.2d 414 (N.D. 1967) (invalidating statute
requiring consent of a rural electric cooperative as a condition to granting a certificate
of convenience to a public utility).
222 Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 447, 193 A.2d 103, 109 (1963). See also
Humane Soc'y of the United States v. New Jersey State Fish & Game Council, 129
N.J. Super. 239, 322 A.2d 841 (Ch. Div. 1974) (appointment to Fish and Game Council
limited to sportsmen, farmers, or commercial fishermen).
223 Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 43 N.J. 104, 202 A.2d 689 (1964).
224 See generally Heuerman, Dealer Territorial Security and "Bootlegging" in the
Auto Industry, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 486.
228 Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers' & Salesmen's Lic. Bd. v. Memphis Auto Sales, 103
Ohio App. 347, 356, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 377, 382, 142 N.E.2d 268, 274 (1957). The decision
also condemned the statute as violative of a constitutional prohibition against "special
laws" and on substantive due process grounds.
226 E.g., Joyner v. Centre Motor Co., 192 Va. 627, 66 S.E.2d 469 (1951), which con.
demned an "anti-bootlegging" statute as a special law, the decision also partly resting on
delegation grounds. The constitutionality of a similar South Dakota statute was upheld,
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upheld such a statute with the observation that "[t]he right of the
manufacturer to choose its dealers is merely the right of the freedom
of contract. 227 An earlier case invalidating the Louisiana Fair Trade
Act was unconvincingly distinguished. It seems clear that the court's
decision rests on its view that "this business produces more open com-
petition through advertisement, sales promotion and other media than
any other that comes to our mind and we think that it is truly represen-
tative of free enterprise as practiced in a democracy." '228 Thus the
policy-based distinction for a time made by the Supreme Court in
the White Motor29 case is translated into state constitutional doctrine.
The result seems peculiarly unfitting since the degree of industrial con-
centration in the auto industry makes any delegation broader in scope
than in the ordinary resale price maintenance case and since the power
delegated here is, in effect, a licensing power. But the power exercised
may, because of the existence of a chain of title, still seem to more
closely resemble contract than legislation; taken in this light, the court's
result may seem reasonable even if its distinction of the "fair trade"
cases doesmnot.
Another provocative decision also dealt with licensing powers
thought to have been delegated to a purely private group without pro-
vision for judicial review. In Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers,"I the California Supreme Court. speaking through Justice
Traynor, invalidated on delegation grounds a statute requiring five years
experience with a dispensing optician as a condition to licensure. The
court observed that the statute
confers upon presently licensed dispensing opticians the unlimited
and unguided power to exclude from their profession any or all
persons ...
Delegated power must be accompanied by suitable
safeguards to guide its use and to protect against its misuse ...
The conclusion is inescapable that the experience
the dissent urging application of the nondelegation doctrine. In re Hinesley, 82 S.D. 552,
558, 150 N.W.2d 834, 837 (1967) ; accord, Semke v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Motor Ve-
hicle Comm'n, 465 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1970) (within police power i.
227 Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comn'n v. Wheeling Frenchman, 235 La. 332, 346, 103
So. 2d 464, 469 (1958). Cf. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1173, 1192 (1956).
228 235 La. at 350, 103 So. 2d at 471.
220 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
230 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962). Cf. D'Amico v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974). The analogy
of many such statutory schemes to the medieval and post-medicval guilds is a close one,
though this fact ought not be considered dispositive of their xalidity. See Grant, The
Guild Returns to America, 4 J. PoLITics 303, 458 (1942).
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necessary to qualify a person to dispense optical goods . .
is obtainable in a variety of ways.2"'
This case seems of arguable merit as an application of the non-
delegation doctrine. The licensing power here may be too widely
scattered for it to be thought that an identifiable private group has
been given the power by a single adjudication to dispose of an in-
dividual's rights. Thus the case may be one more appropriate for the
use of economic due process rather than the delegation doctrine; if the
delegation doctrine is used, there is no weighing of interests and no
clear stopping place short of the drastic proposition that all mandatory
apprenticeship schemes are per se unconstitutional."
The California judges might have done well to remember that
medical internship requirements provide another instance of the sur-
vival in the professions of mandatory aprenticeship requirements. Their
financial aspects have been under fire," 3 and there have also been cases
subjecting hospitals to equal protection requirements on the basis that
they exercise delegated licensing power,2' but one would be astonished
to see it contended that internship requirements per se are constitution-
ally impermissible.
It may be true that the contemporary movement, within and in-
creasingly without the traditional professions, has been away from
apprenticeship and toward educational requirements, and that the latter
may seem to partake of a greater objectivity. Learned Hand would
have understood these developments well:
As the social group grows too large for mutual contact and
appraisal, life quickly begins to lose its flavor and its significance.
Among multitudes relations must become standarized; to stan-
darize is to generalize, and to generalize is to ignore all those au-
thentic features which mark, and which indeed alone create, an in-
dividual..
[T]he day has clearly gone forever of societies small
enough for their members to have personal acquaintance with
each other, and to find their station through the appraisal of those
who have any first-hand knowledge of them.235
23157 Cal. 2d at 235, 236, 235, 368 P.2d at 104, 105, 104, 18 Cal Rptr. at 504, 505, 504.
232 One might contrast older state bar association requirements of apprenticeship.
238 Cf. Buttenwieser, The Young Doctors' Dilemma, 193 THF NArIoN 429 (1961).234 See, e.g., Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Greisman v. Newcom
Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963). But see People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 337,
503 P.2d 257, 270, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1972).
235 Proceedings in Memory of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. ix, xiii-xiv, xv (1942)
(remarks of Learned Hand).
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An apprenticeship scheme for river pilots, not dissimilar to that
involved in the Blumenthal case, was vindicated by the Supreme Court
against due process challenge in the much disputed case of Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners.8 There the record revealed
that the apprenticeship requirements operated to restrict entry to the
friends and relatives of present river pilots. "Mark Twain," one critic
of the Kotch decision has suggested, "would surely have felt con-
strained in the most fundamental sense, if his youthful aspiration to
be a river-boat pilot had been frustrated by a State-ordained system of
nepotism."'287 However, that writer seems in fact to have felt more
amused than constrained by the traditional restrictions on river pilot-
age. 2 8
There are, of course, other examples of statutes delegating licens-
ing powers to private groups without provision for review. Perhaps
statutes validating marriages performed by church officials fall into
the same category. There, however, the licensing power is usually
not exclusively conferred on church officials, and such officials are in
any case scattered and numerous. Futhermore, the delegation here
may be thought to relate to a dispensing power, and may be viewed as
more immune to attack on that account," 9 while the ministerial as op-
posed to discretionary character of the determination is also relevant.
It is merely a matter of accepting as authentic an act done under
supposedly inherent guaranties of regularity. The practice may
involve problems in the way of insuring impartial and reliable
certification, and perhaps also service on reasonable terms; it is
a compromise arrangement due to expediency or practical necessity;
288 330 UT.S. 552 (1947). The Blumenthal case was extended even further by the
decision in Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 Cal. Rptr. 332
(1964), which invalidated as a delegation of power to insurance companies a statute re-
quiring doctors in state hospitals to post malpractice insurance. This decision in effect
precluded the state from electing to use the market as an apprais-r of the qualifications
of its doctors (since there was no showing that insurance companies would be motivated
by considerations other than profit in deciding whether to insure particular doctors).
While most of the delegation decisions thus far considered would be applauded by devo-
tees of a free market, the Rosner case well revealed that the doctrine can cut both ways,
since invalidation of statutes on this ground will frequently present the state with only
two alternatives: no regulation at all, or regulation via public owmership or direct ad-
ministrative control
237 McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 46.
238See Twain's amusing account, The Pilots' Monopoly, in LIr oN THE MISSISSIPPI
ch. 15 (1967). Twain himself seems not to have been adverse to resale price maintenance
either. See Clemens v. Estes, 22 F. 899 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885).
239 Cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199-201 (1971) ; Note, The Power of
Dispensation in Administrative Law-A Critical Survey, 87 U. P.,A. L. Rav. 201 (1938).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the secularization of marriage in Germany represents a repudiation
of the compromise in favor of pure officialism.
240
No discussion of statutes providing for private adjudication of
offenses without review would be complete without mention of Dr.
Bonham's Case.241  That case, the first and last British venture into
judicial review of legislative acts," 2 held bad a statute allowing the
College of Physicians to fine persons practicing medicine in London
for more than one month without a license from the college, where half
the fine was to go to the college and half to the king. "The censors
cannot be judges, ministers, and parties; judges to give sentence or judg-
ment; ministers to make summons; and parties to have the moeity of
the forfeiture . *... 124 Neither that case nor later cases2" questioned
the private licensing arrangement itself where a direct pecuniary in-
terest was not as plainly present, though Bonham's Case is memorable
not only for Lord Coke's homilies245 and for what it says about judicial
review but also for its recitals of standards for licensing2" and for its
early observations on the tort immunity of quasi-judicial officers,2 17
including private persons exercising delegated powers.
Statutes requiring job printing done for government agencies to
bear a union label have been invalidated with some consistency,24 usually
on the basis that they violate equal protection or antimonopoly clauses
in state constitutions. Such statutes, particularly where they require
the label of a named union,4 could be viewed as delegating an un-
240E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 48 (1928)
(footnotes omitted).
2418 Co. 113b, 2 Brown. 255, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
242See generally Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARv. L. REV.
30 (1926).
248 8 Co. at l18a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57 (1972).
244 See especially Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Raym. 213, 252, 454, 91 Eng. Rep. 1038,
1065, 1202 (KB. 1697-99) ; which modified several of the holdings in Bonham's Case;
see also College of Physicians v. Levett, 1 Raym. 472, 91 Eng. Rep. 1214 (KB. 1699).
245 "And it was well ordained, that the professors of physic should be profound, sad,
discreet, &c. and not youths, who have no gravity and experience .... " 77 Eng. Rep.
at 651.
2 6 "[F]ive manner of persons were to be promoted, as appears by the said Act,
those who were: 1, profound; 2, sad; 3, discreet; 4, groundly learned; 5, profoundly
studied." Id.
24777 Eng. Rep. at 657-58. These questions are no more settled now than they were
then. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 26.01-.07 (Supp. 1970).
248 See, e.g., Upchurch v. Adelsberger, 231 Ark. 682, 332 S.W.2d 242 (1960). See
generally 10 E. McQuiLIiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.48 (1966), and
cases there cited.
249 Two cases invalidating statutes requiring the label of a specific union are Up-
church v. Adelsberger, 231 Ark. 682, 332 S.W.2d 242 (1960); International Printing
Pressmen & Assistants Union v. Meier, 115 N.W.2d 18, 20 (N.D. 1962):
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checked licensing power, and might perhaps be distinguished from "pre-
vailing union wage" statutes in this respect." But since the time of
the Wagner Act, governments have been allowed to afford various
degrees of positive aid to the process of unionization."' The mere re-
quirement that contractors be engaged in collective bargaining relation-
ships with their employees would not seem to contravene equal pro-
tection standards, though requiring a contract with a specific union
might do so, or might (passing the problem of standing) be viewed as
denying procedural due process to contractors by delegating licensing
functions.
Courts have generally been willing to vindicate delegation of
licensing powers to purely private groups where de novo review is
provided in a public agency or in the courts. The best-known example of
this willingness is that supplied by the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers. This organization was created pursuant to the Maloney
Act of 19 38 ..2 as a body, equipped with disciplinary powers over its
members, whose determinations are subject to revie-w de novo by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which in turn is subject to a lesser
degree of review by the courts. The Act so structures the apparatus
of securities regulation as to in effect require that all brokers and
dealers belong to the NASD. Nonmembers of the group are deprived
by statute of the opportunity to participate in important distributions,
so that membership is in effect compulsory for persons not members of
a stock exchange. The delegation was summarily upheld." 3 Other
legislative proposals would have broadened it by allowing NASD orders
Here we are not concerned with a law which requires union lhbor or the use of
a union label, but we are considering the validity of a statute which requires the
use of one particular union label . . . to the detriment of all other union labels.
Thus the argument advanced by the appellants-that the requirement of a union
label guarantees superior work-is irrelevant because the Corrad company does
have a union label; it merely does not have the right to use athe particular label
which is required by our law.25o See notes 166-68 supra.
251 See 65 Aiu. Jun. 2d Public Works and Contracts § 201 (1072).
252 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970). See generally Nassau Sec. Srv. v. SEC, 348 F.2d
133 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Rutter, The National Association of Securities Dealers, 7 VILL. L.
REv. 611 (1962).
2 3 R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
855 (1952). See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 95 S. Ct 2427 (1975)
(by implication). Cf. United Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). See generally Jennings, Self Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMSP. PRoB. 663, 679-90
(1964); Hed-Hoffmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C. Ixn. & Com. L. REv. 187
(1965); Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD Suitability
Rules, 22 AtA. L. REv. 15 (1969) ; Comment, Implied Civil Liability Arising from Viola-
tion of the Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Ray.
151 (1975).
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to become effective without a stay pending appeal to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.'
The availability of de novo review in the courts has also been the
basis on which delegation of disciplinary functions to an "integrated
bar" association has been upheld in state courts."' It is difficult to say
whether de novo review by a public administrative agency subject in
turn to some check by the courts is in practice a greater or lesser safe-
guard than direct de novo judicial review, but both approaches have
been upheld where tested.
Cases involving the Railway Labor Adjustment Board supply
another instance where de novo review in the courts was thought
-necessary and sufficient to protect due process where purely private
persons were given judicial, functions. The Railway Labor Act"
-provides that either party to a grievance dispute may refer it to the
National Railway Adjustment Board.5 7 The Act had been construed
to give the Board, a group composed of equal numbers of private
persons designated by labor and management, exclusive primary juris-
diction over the dispute to the exclusion of any common law remedy
available to the employee... or the employer." 9 It had been held that
due process does not demand that employees be allowed judicial review
of board decisions denying claims,8 ' even though this result allowed
employers, by referring cases to the Board, to deprive employees of a
common law remedy which would otherwise exist. However, due pro-
cess had been held to demand that the employer be given a right to
judicial review of money judgments against him. The courts, taking
note of the private composition of the Board, held that nothing less
than de novo review is sufficient to preserve the constitutionality of the
statute as aplied to the employer,"' though it had been held that this
254 The Securities Act amendment of 1964 retained the automatic stay pending appeal
-o the SEC but allowed the SEC after notice and brief hearing (upon affidavit and oral
-argument) to set aside the stay in particular cases. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g) (1970) ; cf.
Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971) (existence of antitrust
immunity a question of fact); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).255 See Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 228 P.2d 554 (1951). Cf. note 196 supra.
25 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1970).
257 See generally Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment ,Board: A Unique
Administrative Agency, 46 YLE L.J. 567, 584 (1937).
25SUnion Pac. Ry. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959).
259 Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965) ; Ruffin v. Division 3,
"Nat'l R.R. Adjustment Bd., 368 F. Supp. 990, 992-93 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
28 oSee Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959), which, however, involved an
independent action in the district court, not an effort to seek de novo review of the
Board's award.
2681 Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941), aff'd by an
'equally divided Court, 319 U.S. 732 (1943). Cf. Barnett v. Pennsylvania Reading Sea-
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review need not take place until the employee bring3 a suit to enforce
the award and hence that the employer did not have a right to a de-
claratory judgment as to the award's validity. 2 The denial to the em-
ployee of a right to review was presumably justified on the basis that
the act itself deprives him of any common law right of action for
matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board; the Board is
not held to ordinary due process standards since it can only confer
benefits on the employee, not deprive him of extant rights."' This
justification for denial of review to employees assumes that the Board
remedy is exclusive and primary, and that courts are deprived of jur-
isdiction over claims even though neither party has referred a claim
to the Board. The fact that a money claim is involved, and the holding
that the availability of state remedies for railroad labor contract viola-
tions is determined by federal law2 " may present Eeventh amendment
problems, since the statutory remedy is a direct substitute for one
available at common law."0' Though the act provides only that parties
"may" refer disputes to the Board, not that they "shall" refer them
there, it has been construed to give the Board exlusive jurisdiction
(save for wrongful discharge claims).2' If the a't were read more
literally, it would in effect delegate to the employer the right to deprive
an employee of a claim cognizable at common law by referring a
case to the Board. But even this delegation might not be thought fatal
to the statute, since courts have upheld statutes giving employers the
right to deprive employees of common law tort claims by setting up
workmen's compensation plans not required of all employers.0 The
delegation to the employer has been thought permissible because of the
employee's voluntary entry into the employment contract. The fact
that under the Railway Labor Act cases wrongful discharge claims
shore Lines, 245 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1957). The carrier's right of review was narrowly
limited by 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970) to jurisdictional questions, fraud or corruption, id. §
153(1) (p), and awards "actually and indisputedly without foundation in reason or fact,"
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2287, and a corresponding right of review given to
employees. The constitutionality of this limitation of the employers' former right was
sustained without reference to the Washington Terminal decision in Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 370 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
262 Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell,
124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
268See K. DAvis, AnMINISTInvE LAW TREATISE § 28.13 (Supp. 1970).
266 1AM v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
265 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WEcHSLri, HART & WECHSIM'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 737-38 (2d ed. 1973).
266 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959).
267 National Bank Bldg. v. Goldsmith, 204 Okla. 45, 226 P.2d 916 (1951).
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(as distinguished from grievance claims) initially remained cognizable
at common law"' suggests the extent to which the existence of a con-
tractual or chain-of-title relationship will lead courts to sustain dele-
gations deemed impermissible where such a relationship is absent
or has terminated." 9 But since the waiver of common law rights is
incorporated by force of law into all contracts in the industry, an "un-
constitutional conditions" problem is present that is not present in
cases allowing employers the option of divesting employees of common
law rights by setting up workmen's compensation plans or allowing a
single party to an agreement to bypass the courts by referring a claim to
binding arbitration where a contract so provides. It is worth noting
that in the recent cases involving the validity as a matter of procedural
due process of the delegations to private parties inherent in replevin
procedures and cognovit notes, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between contracts of adhesion and arm's-length contras.'7"
b. To public boards appointed from private groups
Where the private persons to whom licensing powers are delegated
are formally sworn as public officials, the courts have been prone to hold
that something less than de novo court review will suffice to sustain
the statutory scheme. 17' The fact that members of a board must be
268 Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941); but cf. Slocum v. Delaware,
L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950), involving a subsisting employment relationship. The
distinction is sometimes said to rest not on contract notions but on the fact that future
relations between the railroad and other employees are less involved in discharge than
in grievance cases. Moore was overruled, the constitutional question being expressly re-
served, in Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972). Justice Douglas dis--
sented on constitutional grounds. The prevailing opinion perhaps significantly stresses.
the absence of pre-existing remedies at common law. Id. at 324.
269A state remedy for wrongful discharge has been held unavailable under the
NLRA; see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), where the alternative
was a public administrative remedy. Significantly, in distinguishing Moore, the Court
referred to "the various distinctive features of the administrative remedies provided by
the [Railway Labor] Act. . . . e.g. the makeup of the Adjustment Board, the scope of
review from monetary awards and the ability of the Board to give the same remedies as
could be obtained by court suit," as possibly justifying provision for an alternative remedy
to Adjustment Board procedures in discharge cases. Id. at 657 n.14.
270 Even the removal of grievance claims from the courts disturbed Justice Black.
See id. (Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 204-05
(1962) (Black, J., dissenting). As to replevin and cognovit notes, compare Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (nonwaiver of procedural rights by contract of adhesion),
discussed in note 16 supra, with D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972)
(waiver by arn's-length contracts).
271 The validity of statutes requiring appointment of boards from industry panels
usually arises in a procedural due process rather than nondelegation context. See, e.g.,
Floyd v. Thornton, 220 S.C. 414, 68 S.E.2d 334 (1951) ; Fleisher v. Duncan, 195 Ga. 309,
24 S.E.2d 15 (1943); Lucas v. State ex rel. Board of Medical Regis. & Exam., 229 Ind.
633, 99 N.E.2d 419 (1951). See also the cases collected in Jaffe at 231 n.78. But see
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appointed from a particular occupational group, or from lists furnished
by that group, ordinarily does not disturb the courts where some judi-
cial review is provided. The Supreme Court in the Kotch case made
reference to the right of states to chose their own public officers,;-27
courts generially have taken the view that the controls imposed by ap-
pointment, appropriation, and removal powers and the oaths taken by
public officers make adequate a lesser measure of judicial review than
that necessary to preserve statutes delegating licensing or disciplinary
powers to purely private groups. Thus a Virginia court in 1950 upheld
a statute creating a milk marketing board composed of producers,
distributors, and consumers. The court emphasized that
[m]embers of the Commission are appointed by the Governor and
subject to removal at his pleasure . . . . To hold the act uncon-
stitutional on the ground that two members of the Commission are
interested in the production and distribution of milk would be to
apply the same qualifications to members of an administrative
agency created by the legislature as is required of judges in
trying cases . .. Any person aggrieved by an order of the Com-
missions refusing to issue a license . . . is given a right of
appeal to this court.273
c. To public boards appointed by private groups
Statutes which provide for the direct appointment of board mem-
bers by private groups have received a more hostile reception from the
courts, though here too the weight of judicial opinion still seems to favor
validity. A Delaware act giving state chairmen of political parties
authority to designate members of a county board of elections was in-
validated by a divided court, which distinguished cases in which "the
appointments are to be made from a list of names which allows the ap-
pointing power to exercise some discretion."2I 4  But older "state ac-
Kachian v. Optometry Exam. Bd., 44 Wis. 2d 1, 170 N.W.2d 743 (1969). Even if the
minority view-that a public official's oath and his removability are not sufficient guaran-
tees of an absence of bias-is taken, one might still suggest that a distinction be drawn be-
tween legislative functions such as rate-fixing on the one hand and judicial functions such
as license revocation on the other.
2 72 See notes 47 & 236 supra & text accompanying. Bia cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972).
273Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Conm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35, appeal dis-
missed, 340 U.S. 881 (1950). See also Southeast Milk Sales As3'n v. Swaringen, 290 F.
Supp. 292, 307 (1968) ("A person aggrieved . . . has a right of appeal and to be
heard de novo . . ").
274 State cx rel. James v. Schorr, 45 Del. 18, 28, 65 A.2d 810, 814 (1948). Contra
Driscoll v. Sakin, 121 N.J.L. 225, 1 A.2d 881 (Sup. Ct 1938). The distinction was
vigorously rejected by the dissenting judges in Schorr:
As the important question is whether the Constitution prohibits the delega-
tion of the legislative power to appoint statutory officers to persons not mem-
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tion" cases treating political parties as being bound to the standards of
conduct required of state agencies cast doubt on whether such statutes
do delegate power to private groups. 75 It may also be urged that the
board serves an adversary and mediatory rather than judicial function,
and that group representation is proper since "[t]o insure honest elec-
tions it is essential that the county board be made up at least by the
choice of both powerful political parties."'27
Legislative acts permitting private groups to name members of
various public boards cannot be cavalierly dismissed as efforts by
narrow-minded occupational groups to insulate themselves from public
regulation or scrutiny. For enactments of this sort frequently arise
from a felt need for professional expertise, or, more frequently, from
a desire to insulate a particular governmental function from "politics"
in its invidious sense. The statute relating to the selection of the New
York City Board of Education sustained in Lanza v. Wagner, prob-
ably falls into this category. That statute, and others founded on
similar political premises, have not met with uniform acclaim. The
perennial and protracted controversy over the so-called Missouri Plan
for the selection of judges and the role accorded bar associations under
it278 sheds light upon the political issues which lurk in this field-a
bers of the State government, we are unable to see how any of the cases relied
on by the minority of this Court can be distinguished on the ground that the
named agents were only required to appoint from a list of names furnished by
each of the major political parties. The number that could be named from any
one political party was, also, limited.
45 Del. at 40, 65 A.2d at 820 (Harrington, C., dissenting).
275 ixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), was, to be sure, alluded to by the court
in its decision. But cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). See generally Annot, 97
A.L.R.2d 361 (1964).
27,45 Del. at 37, 65 A.2d at 819 (Harrington, C., dissenting). Cf. United Citizens
Party v. South Carolina State Election Comm'n, 319 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1970), in-
validating a statute which had the effect of permitting a major party to exclude minor
parties from the ballot by altering its primary and convention dates.
277 11 N.Y.2d 317, 183 N.E.2d 670, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, appeal dimnissed, 371 U.S. 74
(1962).
278 Of course, delegation of the power to name judges is somewhat different from
delegation of power to name administrators whose decisions are subject to some measure
of judicial review. But the delegation contemplated by the typical "Missouri Plan"
scheme is a limited one. Usually, the governor is required to select judicial appointees
from persons recommended by a panel, half of whose members are selectd by the gov-
ernor or legislative and half of whom are elected by the bar. Bar associations serve on
nominating committees in the bar elections, though nomination by petition remains pos-
sible. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE ComoN LAW TRADITIoN: DECIDING APPEALs 33-
34 n.24 (1960). Cf. A. DE GRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 103, 214-19 (1951); 1 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (1934). Hostility
toward delegation of judicial powers to persons not drawn from the community at large
or selected by politically responsible officials may account for the demise of the "specialjury" in the United States. Cf. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
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field where the advocates of a greater measure of professional power
and responsibility stand opposed to the contemporary representatives of
the Jacksonian strain in American political thought. The merits of
such controversies need not be discussed here, beyond observing that
committing their resolution to democratic legislatures hardly seems to
do violence to democratic ideals.
Denunciations of state statutes creating industry-dominated state
boards sometimes proceed from a dislike of the policy objectives which
such state boards frequently foster-the protection of small, local
businesses and the prevention of innovation and change."' In creating
such boards, legislators cannot be unaware of the nature of the policies
which they prospectively ratify. Dislike of policy cannot justify con-
stitutional invalidation. Economic folly and social Nisdom may at times
go hand-in-hand;280 and more than one modern judge would remind
us that
[a] motive to build up through legislation the quality of men
may be as creditable in the thought of some as a motive to magnify
the quantity of trade. Courts do not choose between such values
in adjudging legislative powers. They put the choice aside as
beyond their lawful competence.2 8 '
But this is not to say that some of the statutes considered above
may not be challenged on procedural grounds. Adjudication or licens-
ing by a board of interested tradesmen does raise questions of bias and
279 See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
280 Cf. A. DE TOcQUEVlLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AM ERICA pt 4, ch. 7, at 675-76 (G. Law-
rence transl., J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966) :
In our day everything threatens to become so much alike that the peculiar fea-
tures of each individual may soon be entirely lost in the ccmmon physiognomy.
Our forefathers were always prone to make an improper ase of the idea that
private rights should be respected, and we are by nature irlined to exaggerate
the opposite view, that the interest of the individual should always give way to
the interest of the many.
It would seem that sovereigns now only seek to do great things with men.
I wish that they would try a little more to make men great, that they should
attach less importance to the work and more to the workrran, that they should
constantly remember that a nation cannot long remain great if each man is in-
dividually weak, and that no one has yet devised a form of society or a political
combination which can make a people energetic when it is composed of citizens
who are flabby and feeble.2 8
1 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 100 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (upholding Ken-
tucky chain store tax act). Cf. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (invalidating act requiring majority of shareholders in drug-
stores to be registered pharmacists). The continuing force of the latter case was ques-
tioned in Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 (1949), and the case
was later overruled.
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12lack of fairness, even when the board members are sworn as public
officials and subject to political controls. Such actions are open to ob-
jections that private rulemaking and rate-fixing are not. For denial
of a license or application of a sanction bear more heavily on particular
individuals than the announcement of general rules, even when these
rules are aimed at a particular group or particular manner of doing
business. Moreover, arbitrariness and unfairness in rulemaking and
rate-fixing is readily susceptible to legislative detection and control,
whereas unfairness in consideration of a particular application or offense
is unlikely to be brought to public view, and even when disclosed may be
explained away on the basis of particular facts or may be found
difficult of redress or correction.
Courts, however, ought not go so far as to accept as a constitu-
tional requirement a recent suggestion for legislative reform of the
licensing field:
The legislature could... provide for registration of all who wished
to be licensed. . . . Then, in order to maintain high levels of rec-
titude, provision could be made for a decree of suspension or
revocation upon a finding, after suitable judicial proceedings, that
the licensee had misrepresented his skill or training, had demon-
strated his incompetence, or had engaged in dishonorable conduct
relevant to his occupation.
This proposal envisages the creation of an appropriate ad-
ministrative agency . . . to initiate actions in court by the filing
of duly detailed complaints ... .283
It is clear, as those making such proposals would concede, that a
number of occupations are not suited to such loose control. Medicine is,
no doubt, the most obvious case in point. It likewise seems clear that
any professional regulatory board will, whether deliberately so de-
signed or not, tend to contain members of the affected profession. One
might suggest that courts are usually unsuited to the making of judg-
ments as to which occupations do, and which do not, require licensing
or regulation. One might further suggest that judicial control over
occupational licensing boards is best achieved by focusing on their
functions, rather than on their composition. Where the function of the
board is merely to make rules, the composition of the board would
seem quite irrelevant. The constitution does not demand that legisla-
tors be unbiased or that their lives be free of conflicting interests when
282 See K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATrV LAW TREATISE § 12.03 (Supp. 1970).
283 W. GELLHORN, INDiVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 149-50
(1956) (footnote omitted). Cf. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 227, 492 n.9
(1960).
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they pass on legislation; there is no reason to impose more onerous re-
quirements on administrators performing legislative functions. Any
cure for arbitrariness or invidious discrimination on the part of regu-
latory boards should find its source in the doctrines of equal protection
that likewise limit the actions of legislatures.
2. Delegation of Rulemaking Powers
The delegation to private groups of rulemaking powers has
ordinarily met with more gentle treatment at the hands of the courts,
notwithstanding Carter and Schechter. Where an arrangement re-
quires the assent of a large percentage of producers, or where it is
based upon arrangements negotiated by them (even though these ar-
rangements may have been negotiated in contemplation of the statutory
scheme), both the temptations of the market and political exigencies
impose important checks.2"" Nor are abuses under such schemes tin-
likely to be perceived and corrected by the public.
These considerations may account for the vindication by the
Supreme Court and by state courts of marketing schemes, both agricul-
tural and industrial, whose differences from that condemned in the
Carter case are more formal than real. Thus, statutory schemes re-
quiring programs initiated by public authorities to be approved by a
referendum of producers have been sustained,285 as have schemes which
cannot operate until initiated by a specified number of producers.28 6
State courts have bridled where power is delegated to private groups to
fix prices"T or the hours of operation of independent businesses 2as
without any formal checks by public officers, but this hostility is not
as apparent where the power delegated relates to the hours and con-
ditions of work of employees 2 -_a throwback, perhaps, to the days
2 8 4 Cf. Jaffe at 234-53. a
285 E.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939) ; Schweg-
mann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 767, 112 So. 2d 606, appeal dismissed,
361 U.S. 114 (1959) ; and the cases cited in Jaffe at 241 n.110 ()11 involving agricultural
schemes). Cf. Walker v. Louisiana Exp'y Auth., 274 So. 2d 716, 722 (La. App. 1973).
280 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (labor standards);
Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 503, 244 P.2d 841 (1951) (oil unitization
acts) ; Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951),
appeal dimnissed, 343 U.S. 390 (1952).
287 State v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 Miss. 869, 97 So. 2d 372 (1957) (insurance rates).
Cf. Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 916, 918-22 (1973) (barbershops).
288 Hollingsworth v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.2d 64
(1940) (barber's prices and hours) ; Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d
631 (1958) ; Revne v. Trade Comm'n, 113 Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563 (1948).
289See Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405, 100 N.E. 563 (1913), aqi'd, 237 U.S. 391 (1915)
(installation of washrooms required on petition) ; Porter Coal Co. v. Davis, 231 Ala.
359, 165 So. 93 (1935) (appointment of weighman on petition of miners).
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prior to Nebbia v. New York."' °
The courts have ordinarily had little difficulty with statutes dele-
gating rulemaking or price-fixing powers to boards made up of mem-
bers of an industry."'
The 1953 California case of State Board of Dry Cleaners v.
Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc.292 announced a different rule, condemning
a statute allowing a board "made up of six active members of the indus-
try, and one member of the public at large" to set minimum rates. 8 A
strong dissenting opinion by Justice Traynor emphasized the fact that
"[t]he members of the State Board of Dry Cleaners are appointed by
the Governor and approved by the Senate. They are officials of the
state, paid by the state for administering the law, and their acts are
reviewed by the judiciary."' ' This emphasis on the political checks
inherent in the appointment and confirmation of public officials is of
even greater validity as applied to statutes which confer a removal
power upon a state governor. In addition, the oaths of office taken by
board members may have some restraining influence.29 5 As noted above,
however, a different attitude may be proper where licensing or adjudica-
tory functions are at issue.' In 1972, California adhered to the Thrift-
D-Lux rule in Allen v. California Board of Barber Examiners,29 ' in-
validating a law which permitted the Board, composed primarily of
members of that profession, to set minimum barbershop prices. The
intermediate court found the act was a "delegation of a power to fix
prices," holding Thrift-D-Lux squarely applicable.29  It should be
noted that the Board possessed the enforcement power of license re-
290 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
291 See the cases cited in notes 271 & 286 supra.
29240 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953). The court observed that "[w]here the Legis-
lature attempts to delegate its powers to an administrative board made up of interested
members of the industry . . . that delegation may well be brought into question." Id. at
449, 254 P.2d at 36. An asserted lack of standards was also emphasized. In State v.
Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940), a statute similar to that in the Thrift-D-Lux
case was invalidated on substantive due process grounds and for want of standards. The
court observed that the composition of the board though "[n]ot of itself sufficient to in-
validate the statute . . . invites the scrutiny of the Court as to the public nature of the
objectives really pursued . . . ." Id. at 762, 6 S.E.2d at 864-65. But cf. Union School
Dist. v. Commissioner of Labor, 103 N.H. 512, 176 A.2d 332 (1961), upholding a statute
giving an industry-dominated board power to set the "prevailing wage rate:' See generally
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAgv. L. REv. 1667,
1793-1802 (1975).
293 40 Cal. 2d at 448, 254 P.2d at 36.
29 4 Id. at 456, 254 P.2d at 40.
295 Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Soc'y, 165 N.Y. 517, 59 N.E. 353
(1901) is the leading case stressing this distinction.2 99 See text accompanying notes 283-84 supra.
297 25 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 102 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1972).
298 Id. at 1020, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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vocation.
Similarly, the making of criminal legislation by private delegates
may be constitutionally objectionable. Since violation of such legislation
carries about it a moral stigma, it may not be inappropriate to insist
that its enactment be reserved to the legislature or some other body
fully representative of the sense of the community at large. This view
has been apparent in some of the cases involving delegation to private
parties.99 as well as in the early reluctance,3" since overcome, to allow
public administrative bodies to promulgate penal regulations, and in
the continuing reluctance to allow the size of penalties to be set by
private groups. Similar thoughts may underlie the recent invalidation
on procedural due process grounds of state replevin statutes."'
3. Delegation of Administrative Powers
Another important class of delegations are those that might be
denominated delegations of administrative powers-powers which do
not involve the making of rules enforced and enforceable in the ordinary
courts, and yet which do not in their exercise bear so heavily on
particular persons as to constitute licensing or adjudication." 2 Such
delegations are often little noted in the reported cases. One student
of this area has called for
an emphasis on administration as distinguished from administra-
tive law. Law can promote but it can also impede. The ultimate
answers to our besetting problems . . . are not to be found in
judicial utterances, for they are essentially the problems of laymen
in fields calling for more than what mere law has to offer.2 3
Delegations to private parties of the character here under con.
sideration take place when the legislature entrusts the management of
public functions to private institutions, or significantly supports such
institutions in their activities.
The litigation surrounding such delegations usually concerns the
299 See Olinger v. People, 140 Colo. 397, 344 P.2d 689 (1959) (voters of conservancy
districts invalidly delegated authority to enact penal ordinances) ; People v. Malmud, 5
Misc. 2d 65, 158 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Spec. Sess.), rev'd on other grornds, 4 App. Div. 2d 86,
164 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1957) (invalid delegation of voice in makinrg penal rules to bond-
holders of bridge and tunnel authority). For an analysis similar to that in McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), discussed in text accompanying, notes 10-11 supra, see
Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 280, 450 P.2d 1013 (1969) (jury).300 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
01 E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 619 (1974) ("the process proceeds under judicial supervision and manage-
ment!').302 See generally P. WOLL, AD,£mNSm IVE LAW: THE INXORmAL PRocEss (1963).
808 Landis, Book Review, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 597, 600 (1963).
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duties of the delegates under the equal protection clause rather than
the validity of the delegation itself. Where litigation does take place
under the doctrine, the delegations are usually upheld. Thus an Illinois
court, in an opinion by Justice Schaefer, upheld a statute providing
that a railroad terminal authority could, by contract, vest in a com-
mittee "including but not limited to" interested railway companies
authority to supervise and manage terminal facilities."' The court
observed that the statute allowed the authority to
avail itself of the services of those who are presumably most
familiar with the problems involved. To this extent it con-
templates that delegation of administrative duties, but in this we
see no constitutional violation. . . If this sensible and ap-
parently harmless provision should be abused, a question not now
presented would arise30 5
The court did not make clear the constitutional basis of its reservation.
Likewise, a federal court sustained a statute vesting in private banks
the trusteeship of funds belonging to certain Indian tribes."' The
court, citing Berman v. Parker,"7 noted that the powers involved were
essentially managerial in character. A statute delegating to a quasi-
public corporation the power to provide recreational facilities was upheld
with the explanation that provision of recreational facilities was not a
"purely municipal function." ' 8 Similarly, the familiar sort of statute
vesting various powers in a volunteer fire department was upheld in a
Wisconsin decision against challenge on nondelegation grounds."0 9 A
Wyoming court has upheld a municipal employment bargaining law,
including a compulsory arbitration clause, against a nondelegation
challenge.31
30 People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 2d 230, 151
N.E.2d 311 (1958). See also People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Caliendo, 50 Ill. 2d 72, 277
N.E.2d 319 (1971) (Urban Transportation District Act).
805 14 II. 2d at 240, 151 N.E.2d at 317.
806 Crain v. First Nat'l Bank, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963).
307 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Cf. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist, 410 U.S. 719, 729 (1973), holding the principles of the reapportionment cases in-
applicable to a water district "not exercis[ing] what might be thought of as 'normal gov-
ernmental' authority." Contra, City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 79 Misc. 2d 676, 362
N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1974), holding in violation of the equal protection clause a state
statute requiring compulsory arbitration of public employee labor disputes, since impasse
arbitrators wield governmental power but were not chosen in accordance with the one-
man, one-vote rule.
308 Board of County Conm'rs v. White, 79 Wyo. 420, 445, 335 P.2d 433, 442 (1959).309 Rockwood Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Town of Kossuth, 260 Wis. 331, 50 N.W.2d
913 (1952).$10 State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946, IAFF v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295
(Wyo. 1968). See generally note 119 supra.
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It may be noted that there has been little litigation concerning the
validity of statutes according private police degrees of immunity from
suit and rights of a nature similar to those accorded public officials. 11
It would not be difficult to equate the powers typically accorded such
police with adjudicatory powers, the delegation of which has tradi-
tionally been condemned, since extrajudicial exercises of the powers of
police impinge on the rights of particular individuals, and cannot easily
be equated merely with rulemaking. However, the courts have gen-
erally given effect to the immunities extended to private policemen. 1'
Since the end of the days of groups like the Pennsylvania Coal and Iron
Police, 1' the subject has not been a live issue, though statutes authoriz-
ing so-called "industrial police" survive in some states. It has been made
plain that the acts of the remaining "private police" constitute "state
action" subject to the fourteenth amendment equal protection guaran-
tees. "' The absence of litigation contesting the validity of "industrial
police" laws has made it unnecessary for the courts to consider the
reach, if any, of Justice Jackson's dictum 15 about the state's monopoly
on violence as applied to legislative grants of powers of arrest and im-
munities like those available to police, or to consider the source in the
constitution of any limitations upon such grants. It was, fittingly,
Justice Frankfurter who called a halt in two of the mass picketing
cases 1 6 to expansion even of the techniques used by the labor and civil
rights movements:
It must never be forgotten . . . that the Bill of Rights
was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free
speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the
peaceful means of gaining access to the mind. It was in order to
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes
811 Of course, at common law the police had rights little greater than those of private
citizens. See Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without c Warrant, 49 HAlv. L.
REv. 566 (1936).
312See, e.g., Fagan v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 29) Pa. 109, 149 A. 159
(1930). But cf. Dart Drug, Inc. v. Linthicum, 300 A.2d 442 (D.C. App. 1973). See
generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 15, 51-61 (1963). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-3-2-1 to -6
(Code ed. 1975) for authority and immunity for shopkeepers in detaining suspected shop-
lifters.
318 See Shalloo, The Private Police of Pennsylvania, 146 AL3NALs 55 (1929). See
generally Comment, Private Police Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38 U. CHi. L.
REv. 555 (1971).
814 Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); United States v. Hoffman, 498 F.2d
879 (7th Cir. 1974).315See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561 577 (1(51) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
316 Hughes v. Superior Ct, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a
generous scope.31 7
Legislation has again focused attention on the problems surround-
ing government use of private groups to administer its programs. Vari-
ous antipoverty measures contained provisions for the channelling of
funds through private organizations, thus again proving, if proof were
needed, that institutions commonly thought to be "vested interests" are
not the sole beneficiaries of the governmental delegations here con-
sidered. Recent education bills contain extensive provisions for aid to
private and parochial institutions, while direct grants in aid to private
colleges are a commonplace. On the one hand, administration of public
programs through private groups makes possible a greater variety of
approaches, promotes diversity by offsetting the effect on private activ-
ities of universal taxation and makes it possible for the government to
aid programs assumed to be beneficial which it would not be thought
proper for the government to administer directly. 18 It makes possible
the use for government purposes of existing private institutions and
provides leverage to induce change in those institutions-including
such institutions as the church and the family. It also can provide means
of bypassing other publicly responsible agencies at state and local levels
through creation of and assistance to new private groups. Contrari-
wise, administration through private groups can be viewed as destructive
of their autonomy,819 or as a deleterious means of allowing the govern-
ment to avoid accountability for its actions, or as promotive of an exces-
sive amount of separatism and segregation: economic, racial, or reli-
gious (the latter charge is frequently levelled at programs for aid to
private and religious education and may perhaps, with equal justice, be
levelled at many means-tested programs)."'2 It also may be viewed as
aggrandizing the power of aggregates, whether governmental or private,
at the expense of the individual. 2'
These conflicts arising in respect to any transfer of governmental
powers or resources to private groups have long been at the center of
$17 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc,, 312 U.S. 287, 293
(1941).
318 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
319 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
320 See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDoM (1962); E. WEST, EDUCATION AND
THE STATE: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (2d ed. 1970); Boulding, Book Review,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1966). See also J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITAIUANISM,
LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81, 216-17 (A. Lindsay ed. 1950).
821 Cf. Kurland, Foreward-Church and State in the United States: A New Era of
Good Feelings, 1966 Wis. L. Rzv. 215; Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying
Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DuxE L.J. 1217.
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the controversies surrounding the meaning and scop! of the establish-
ment clause-itself a prohibition of one form of delegation. It has been
suggested above that one standard for determining the permissibility of
delegations should be whether the powers delegated to private groups
are legislative in character or rather are judicial: greater safeguards
may be required in the latter case than in the former. Many of the
most important objections to government aid to private groups, as
Lemon v. Kurtzman" 2 makes clear, center on the extent to which
government aid may destroy the autonomy of priv te institutiois, or
the extent to which inadmissible favoritism toward particular political
or religious groups, classes or persons may be practiced. Most distri-
butions of government largesse, since they depend on appropriations
and taxation falling on the community at large, do not merit judicial
review since the operative political checks are sufficient. The same may be
said even if the suggestions of Professors Corwin,32 Jaffe,"4 and
Reich" 5 are accepted and all or nearly all government disbursements
or allocations are made potentially subject to judicial review on broader
constitutional grounds, such as equal protection. The canons of re-
straint that remain relevant continue to relate to the distinction between
legislation and adjudication. If the legislature determines that a broad
class of beneficiaries be aided, and the beneficiaries and amounts of
benefits are defined according to a limited number of objective standards
so that only ministerial tasks need be carried out by the government,
then the delegation in all its implications would seem a delegation sub-
ject to adequate political checks, and judicial invaidation would be
inappropriate. If, on the other hand, the effect of the delegation is to
leave government officials broad powers to choose i.mong prospective
private recipients, then many of the dangers giving rise to the existing
constitutional bars to specific types of delegations are present, political
checks are less adequate, and judicial invalidation of the totality of
the delegation as well as of its implementation may be more appropri-
ate.32 Perhaps two specific examples may point the moral. In two
establishment clause cases the Maryland Court of Appeals respectively
invalidated state grants to certain named religious colleges, '27 yet sus-
322403 U.S. 602 (1971).
823 E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934 .
324 Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1958).
265 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
320 Similar tests are of course relevant in determining when zdministrative agencies
should act by decision and when they should act by rule. Cf. A. PEKELis, LAW AND So-
cAL AcTION 90 (1950).32 Horace Mann League of the United States v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md.
645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966).
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tained tax exemptions in favor of churches and church-run educational
institutions.828 In justification of the disparity in results, the court, was
able to advance only an historical justification: logically both forms of
grant were "establishments," but "logic is a minion of the law, not its
master." '29 Under the Maryland court's reasoning, the New York
"scholar-incentive" plan, based on direct grants to students coupled
with added grants to the institutions they elect to attend, would also
be invalid unless partially upheld on the perhaps somewhat disingenuous
basis that it aids the student and not the institution.3 10 Yet surely tax
exemptions to religious and charitable institutions, tax credits for tui-
tion, and direct grants to students or per capita to the institutions they
attend are not subject to many of the objections to which direct grants
to named colleges are subject, or to which federal research grants in
varying amounts to specific universities are subject."' Where blanket
per capita grants or tax exemptions are given to a wide class of in-
stitutions, the dangers of favoritism, destruction of the autonomy of
private groups or aggrandizement of powers of the government that
are among the principal bases of the establishment clause and similar
"public use" provisions are not present in anything like the same
measure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
What conclusions may be drawn from this protracted review of
the history in our law of the notion that "delegations to private parties
are invalid"?
The first conclusion is a negative one: that the nondelegation
doctrine, in its commonly expressed form, is nonsense. As to this we
may refer to the words of John Chipman Gray:
Especially valuable is the negative side of aryalytic study.
On the constructive side it may be unfruitful; but there is no
better method for the puncture of windbags. Most of us hold in
our minds a lot of propositions and distractions which are in fact
identical, or absurd or idle, and which we believe, or pretend to
828 Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 816 (1966); see also Waz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
829 241 Md. at 399, 216 A.2d at 906.
330 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464 (1973) ; Cochran v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). Cf. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1961).
331 It may be well to allude here to the less fashionable portions of President Eisen-
hower's farewell speech, including the reference to government-financed research con-
tracts as "virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity." Farewell Radio and Television
Address to the American People, Jan. 17, 1961, in 1960-61 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS OF THE UNITER STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 421, at 1035, 1038 (1961).
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ourselves to believe, and which we impart to others as true and
valuable. If our minds and speech can be cleared of these, it is no
small gain.33 2
The second conclusion is that it is a pernicious notion that private
rights can only be contracted and not expanded,3 3 and that a wide scope
can and does remain for government conferral of power on private
groups and individuals, particularly where the powers conferred are
not judicial or licensing powers, or are subject to public review. As
to, this, and as to the related questions presented by the growth of the
"state action" doctrines, we may refer to the timely cautionary words
of Alexander Pekelis:
Plato, who knew how to be consequent, and Socrates, who knew
how to choose his interlocutors, dearly saw the links between
unity of a society and the total destruction of the element of
arbitrariness in all human relations, beginning with the relations
between man and wife, parent and child. If we try to match their
intellectual courage, we shall concede that unless a certain element
of capriciousness and arbitrariness is introduced in the world,
unless differences which are in a sense arbitrary, nonrational differ-
ences are admitted, preserved, and protected, unless our society is
a society of societies, a community of communitie, real freedom
cannot be achieved.
. . . The more unisonal harmony of which Aristotle speaks
is attempted in the American system through the peculiarity of
a constitutional control which is not dissimilar to the judge's con-
trol of a jury. It leaves ample room for nonrational, intuitional,
experimental, and arbitrary elements. It renounces, by definition,
the idea of perfection, makes justice a question of degree, and is
satisfied with keeping the juror's whim or discretion and the several
governments' discretion or whim within the minimum limits of
reason, and thus to reconcile diversity with equality and the rule
of law with the freedom of men."3"
The third conclusion relates to the appropriate standards for test-
ing the validity of statutes assailed as violative of the nondelegation
doctrine. Among the factors that should be weighed are the following:
1. Does the statute confer upon private delegates the power not
only to make rules but to apply the law to particular individuals?
332J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 2 (1921)
333 Some, even, would restrict private rights to the constitutiomi mininium. See Hen-
dn, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 637
(1961).
334 A. PEKErLS, Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAW AND SO-
cLAL AcrioN 91, 124-26 (1950).
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2. Are the actions of private delegates subject to no further public
or judicial review, or to review only upon attenuated standards such as
the substantial evidence rule?
3. Are the private delegates chosen by a process involving public
consent, as by nomination or confirmation by elected officials?
4. Are the private delegates sworn to oaths of office?
5. Do the private delegates have pecuniary interests in the deter-
minations to be made?
6. Is a power to define criminal acts or impose penal sanctions
delegated ?
7. Is the delegation one of powers threatening the state's mono-
poly of violence, or one of a breadth and scope threatening the ultimate
corrective powers of the legislature?
8. Is the delegation, if one of administrative powers or financial
resources, one in which the delegates and their powers are defined
according to a limited number of objective standards, or is it rather
one which accords the government broad powers to pick and choose
among prospective delegates?
Consideration of these questions will, it is believed, serve to clarify,
if not to resolve, most of the issues raised by the nondelegation doctrine
in its contemporary applications.
The final conclusion is that the distinction-now so eroded-
between legislative and judicial functionsl---is more relevant in resolv-
ing these problems of delegation than many have been prone to assume.
There is still merit in Mr. Justice Jackson's familiar proposition:
Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by
due process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly re-
quires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible
than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less
with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment.
Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized respon-
sibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do
not bend before political branches of the Government, as they
should on matters of policy which comprise substantive law.86
Of course, insistence on procedural fairness has implications for the
substance of legislation.
$85 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965) ; cf. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process
-of Time and Law, 79 HIv. L. REv. 56 (1965).8S Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
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[P]leadings must be filed and evidence presented before a judg-
ment could be had; cause must be shown, forms filled out, com-
pliance with license conditions proved, before executive or ad-
ministrative action. Herein the effect of the the law's formality
was similar to that of the law's insistence on generalizing (abstract-
ing) from particulars. In both respects the availability of legai
process encouraged men to increase their awareness of relation-
ships among things and events and thereby to sharpen their eyes
to the existence of gains and costs and the sources of gain or
cost.
37
Indeed, nothing dramatizes this more than the far-reaching effects of
much recent legislation of a procedural character-the National En-
vironmental Policy Act,338 for example. The answer to the political
needs and forces giving rise to delegations is not to be found in blanket
condemnation of delegation nor in a constitutionally compelled unitary
state. It is rather to be found in focusing on the difference between
rulemaking and adjudication, and in insistence that delegations in the
later category be subject to adequate judicial or public review. Only
thus can we, in dealing with this limited but important congeries of
problems, live up to Whitehead's reminder that
[t]he art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the
symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure
that the code serves those purposes which satisfy an enlightened
reason 339
a definition which demands that we be prepared, in Holmes' words, "to
learn to transcend our own convictions and to leave room for much
that we hold dear to be done away with short of revolution by the
orderly change of law." 340
337 J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES hISTORY 142 (1960).
338 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970).
839 A. WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM, ITS MEANING AND EFFECT 88 (1927).
340 O.W. HOLMES, Law and the Conrt, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295 (1920).
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